We develop a dynamic model of platform economy where tokens serve as a means of payments among platform users and are issued to finance investment in platform productivity. Tokens are optimally issued to reward platform owners when the productivity-normalized token supply is low and burnt to boost the franchise value when the productivity-normalized normalized supply is high.
We explore the landscape of public company auditing around the introduction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934. Using a broad sample of historical annual reports spanning several decades, we document that most public companies obtained audits even before the SEC’s audit mandate, which limited the mandate’s impact on audit rates. We further document that these companies selected their auditors based on characteristics reflecting independence and competence, even before the SEC’s mandate.
We predict and find that regulated firms' mandatory disclosures crowd out unregulated firms' voluntary disclosures. Consistent with information spillovers from regulated to unregulated firms, we document that unregulated firms reduce their own disclosures in the presence of regulated firms' disclosures. We further find that unregulated firms reduce their disclosures more the greater the strength of the regulatory information spillovers.
Mutual fund prospectuses contain a wealth of qualitative information about fund strategies, yet a systematic analysis of this content is missing from the literature. We use machine learning to group together funds with similar strategy descriptions, and ask whether they act in accordance with the text. Despite weak legal recourse for investors, we find that mutual funds largely do keep their promises. We document a market-based disciplinary mechanism: when funds diverge from their group's core strategy, investors withdraw capital.
We show that a rise in the minimum wage accounts for a large decline in earnings inequality in Brazil since 1994. To this end, we combine rich administrative and survey data with an equilibrium model of the Brazilian labor market. Our results imply that the minimum wage has far-reaching spillover effects on wages higher up in the distribution, accounting for one-third of the 25.9 log point fall in the variance of log earnings in Brazil since 1994. At the same time, the minimum wage's effects on employment and output are muted by reallocation of workers toward more productive firms.
This paper studies systemic risk in the interbank market. We first establish that in the German interbank lending market, a few large banks intermediate funding flows between many smaller periphery banks. We then develop a network model in which banks trade off the costs and benefits of link formation to explain these patterns. The model is structurally estimated using banks' preferences as revealed by the observed network structure before the 2008 financial crisis.
The covered interest rate parity (CIP) condition is a fundamental arbitrage relationship in international finance. In this chapter, we review its breakdown during the Global Financial Crisis and its continued failure in the subsequent decade. We review how to measure CIP deviations, discuss the drivers of CIP deviations, and the implications of CIP deviations for global financial markets.
We investigate risk and return in the major corporate bond markets of the developed world. We find that average returns increase with maturity and ratings class (where ratings go from high to low) and that this pattern is fit well by a global CAPM model, where the market consists of equity, sovereign and corporate bonds. Nonetheless, we strongly reject "asset class integration," finding a model which separates the market portfolio into its three components to fit much more of the corporate bond return variation.
We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information about their competitors’ contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders’ common reactions to unobserved shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders into an information-sharing platform. Upon entering, lenders adjust their contract terms toward what others offer. This reaction is mediated by the distribution of market shares: lenders with higher shares or that operate in concentrated markets react less.