Corporate Finance

We propose a model of asset management in which benchmarking arises endogenously, and analyze its unintended welfare consequences. Fund managers' portfolios are unobservable and they incur private costs in running them. Conditioning managers' compensation on a benchmark portfolio's performance partially protects them from risk, and thus boosts their incentives to invest in risky assets. In general equilibrium, these compensation contracts create an externality through their effect on asset prices.

In this paper, I estimate the magnitude of an informational friction limiting credit reallocation to firms during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end, borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected. I show how to separately identify private information from information common to all lenders but unobservable to the econometrician by using bank shocks within a discrete choice model of relationships.

Using a price-theoretic framework, we derive and empirically test a fundamental demand force shaping firms’ public disclosure decisions. Our framework suggests that the number of firms’ transacting stakeholders, not just their shareholders, is a major determinant of disclosure demand and, hence, firms’ decision to disclose publicly.

This paper uses simulations to explore the properties of the HP filter of Hodrick and Prescott (1997), the BK filter of Baxter and King (1999), and the H filter of Hamilton (2018) that are designed to decompose a univariate time series into trend and cyclical components. Each simulated time series approximates the natural logarithms of U.S. Real GDP, and they are a random walk, an ARIMA model, two unobserved components models, and models with slowly changing nonstationary stochastic trends and definitive cyclical components.

Short-sale constrained past-winners and losers both underperform strongly in the first year post-formation, earning market-adjusted returns of -13%, and -17%, respectively. However, constrained winners continue to underperform for the following four years, earning a cumulative market-adjusted return of -40% (t = -6.33), while past-losers earn 6% (t = 0.55). This persistence differential cannot be explained by existing models or by simple extensions of existing models.

Our panel has been asked to consider the interaction of markets and policy. In my remarks today, I will specifically consider the interaction between the stock market and the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, which is set to foster economic conditions that achieve the dual-mandate objectives of maximal employment and price stability (targeted as a 2 percent inflation rate). I want to reconcile seemingly conflicting evidence when we interpret the stock market in its aggregate and when we consider an individual firm that trades in the market.

We examine the statistical term structure model of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and its affine counterpart, developed in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008), in several out-of-sample analyzes. The model's one-factor forecasting structure characterizes the term structures of additional currencies in samples ending in 2003. In post-2003 data one-factor structures again characterize each currency's term structure, but we reject equality of the coefficients across the two samples.

Amazon's entry into Finland had been expected for years by S Group, Finland's largest retailer. Now that the company's arrival in their home market was imminent, S Group needed to decide quickly on the best strategy for survival and the optimal path to future growth. The company's executive board had several options: staying focused on the Finnish market, expanding into global markets, or tapping their world-class data and logistics expertise to forge another path.

Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) develop a model of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, in which the agent experiences prospect-theory inspired "gain-loss utility" by comparing his actual consumption to all his previously expected consumption outcomes. Koszegi and Rabin (2009) generalize the static model to a dynamic setting by assuming that the agent experiences both contemporaneous gain-loss utility over present consumption and prospective gain-loss utility over changes in expectations about future consumption.