Corporate Finance

We decompose the returns of five well-known anomalies into cash flow and discount rate news. Common patterns emerge across the five factor portfolios and their mean variance efficient (MVE) combination. Whereas discount rate news predominates in market returns, systematic cash flow news drives the returns of anomaly portfolios and their MVE combination with the market portfolio. Anomaly cash flow and discount rate shocks are largely uncorrelated with market cash flow and discount rate shocks and with business cycle fluctuations.

We distinguish between "good" and "bad" carry trades constructed from G-10 currencies. The good trades exhibit higher Sharpe ratios and sometimes positive return skewness, in contrast to the bad trades that have both substantially lower Sharpe ratios and highly negative return skewness. Surprisingly, good trades do not involve the most typical carry currencies like the Australian dollar and Japanese yen.

We study how monetary policy and risk shocks affect major asset prices (interest rates, stocks, long-term bonds) in three large economies: the US, the euro area, and Japan. Using a high-frequency framework, we fail to find evidence in favor of monetary policy affecting foreign asset prices through a risk channel. There is however a strong global common component in risk shocks affecting asset prices in all three economies.

We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information about their competitors' contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders' common reactions to unobserved shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders into an information-sharing platform. Upon entering, lenders adjust their contract terms toward what others offer. This reaction is mediated by the distribution of market shares: lenders with higher shares or that operate in concentrated markets react less.

A key distinction between over-the-counter markets and centralized exchanges is the non-anonymity of the transactions. In this paper, we develop a model of non-anonymous trading and compare its prices, liquidity, and efficiency of asset allocations against a baseline with anonymous transactions. The non-anonymity improves the market liquidity by reducing the concerns for adverse selection. More specifically, it allows the market participants to learn valuable information about their counterparties through repeated interactions and consequently enables them to form trading relationships.

The equity variance risk premium is the expected compensation earned for selling variance risk in equity markets. The variance risk premium is positive and shows moderate persistence. High variance risk premiums coincide with the left tail of the consumption growth distribution shifting down. These facts, together with a positive, yet moderate, difference between the risk-neutral entropy and variance of the aggregate market return, refute the bulk of the extant consumption-based asset pricing models. We introduce a tractable habit model that does fit the data.

This paper offers the first study of how changes in corporate R&D investment affect labor mobility. We document that increases in firm R&D have no measurable effect on employee mobility to other incumbent firms or on exit from employment, but do spur employee departures to join the founding teams of startups. These startups are more likely to be outside the R&D-investing employer's industry, suggesting that the ideas moving via employees to startups would impose diversification costs on the parent.

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We derive a measure of firm-level regulatory exposure from the text of corporate earnings calls. We use this measure to study the effect of regulation on companies’ growth, leverage, profitability, and equity returns. Higher regulatory exposure results in slower sales and asset growth, lower leverage, reduced profitability, but higher post-call equity returns. These effects are mitigated for larger firms. Our findings suggest that both compliance risk and physical operational cost are consequences of increased regulation, but the magnitude of the effects of compliance risk are larger.