Decision Making & Negotiations

In an environment where trading volume affects security prices and where prices are uncertain when trades are submitted, quasi-arbitrage is the availability of a series of trades that generate infinite expected profits with an infinite Sharpe ratio. We show that when the price impact of trades is permanent and time-independent, only linear price-impact functions rule out quasi-arbitrage and thus support viable market prices. When trades have also a temporary price impact, only the permanent price impact must be linear while the temporary one can be of a more general form.

We model the trade-off between low-asset risk and low leverage to satisfy preferences for low-risk deposits and apply it to interwar New York City banks. During the 1920s, profitable lending and low costs of raising capital produced increased bank asset risk and increased capital, with no deposit risk change. Differences in the costs of raising equity explain differences in asset risk and capital ratios. In the 1930s, rising deposit default risk led to deposit withdrawals. In response, banks increased riskless assets and cut dividends.

We propose that consumers' investment decisions involve processes of promotion and prevention self-regulation that are managed across separate mental accounts, with different financial products seen as representative of promotion versus prevention.

Griliches' 1994 presidential address considers the limited success economists had in trying to account for the productivity slowdown of the 1970s and 1980s and "urges us toward the task of observation and measurement." In the 1990s, the high rates of productivity growth emphasized the need for new models of productivity, this time turning to estimating organization-level determinants of productivity focusing on businesses' use of new computer-based information technologies (IT), and new methods of work organization (Timothy Bresnahan et al., 2002).

Preference structures that underlie survey or experimental responses may systematically vary during the administration of such measurement. Maturation, learning, fatigue, and response strategy shifts may all affect the sequential elicitation of respondent preferences at different points in the survey or experiment. The consequence of this phenomenon is that responses and effects can vary systematically within the dataset.

How do people react to those who have helped them? The authors propose that a recipient's evaluation of a helper's intentions and the recipient's own attitudes about future interactions with the helper depend partly on the recipient's perceptions of how the helper decided to assist: on the basis of affect, of role, or of cost-benefit calculation.

Motivation research distinguishes two types of goals: (a) ideals, which relate to people's hopes, wishes, and aspirations, and (b) oughts, which relate to people's duties, obligations, and responsibilities. We propose that, in persuasion, the accessibility of ideals increases consumers' reliance on their subjective affective responses to the ad relative to the substance of the message, whereas the accessibility of oughts increases consumers' reliance on the substance of the message relative to their subjective affective responses.

We address infinite-horizon models for oligopolies with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We characterize the equilibrium behavior which arises under simple wholesale pricing schemes. More specifically, we consider a periodic review, infinite-horizon model for a two-echelon system with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers. In every period, each retailer faces a random demand volume, the distribution of which depends on his own retail price as well as those charged by possibly all competing retailers.

The authors hypothesize that when managers integrate two projections to form a sales estimate, they evoke and use a sales range to judge inappropriately the plausibility of each projection. This judged plausibility, as well as the "margin of error" (based on the market research company's typical accuracy), is used to assign weights to each projection. Five experiments find strong evidence for this process and demonstrate a resulting bias.