Decision Making & Negotiations

The aim of strategy is to master a market environment by understanding and anticipating the actions of other economic agents, especially competitors. A firm that has some sort of competitive advantage--privileged access to customers, for instance--will have relatively few competitors to contend with, because potential competitors without an advantage, if they have their wits about them, will stay away. Thus, competitive advantages are actually barriers to entry and vice versa. In markets that are exposed, by contrast, competition is intense.

Focusing on asset returns governed by a factor structure, the APT is a one-period model, in which preclusion of arbitrage over static portfolios of these assets leads to a linear relation between the expected return and its covariance with the factors. The APT, however, does not preclude arbitrage over dynamic portfolios. Consequently, applying the model to evaluate managed portfolios is contradictory to the no-arbitrage spirit of the model.

We show that equity market liberalizations, on average, lead to a one percent increase in annual real economic growth over a five-year period. The effect is robust to alternative definitions of liberalization and does not reflect variation in the world business cycle. The effect also remains intact when liberalization is instrumented with quality of institutions-variables that explain liberalization but not growth and when a growth opportunity measure is included in the regression. Capital account liberalization has a less robust effect on growth than equity market liberalization has.

We provide a formal treatment of both static and dynamic portfolio choice using the Disappointment Aversion preferences of Gul (1991. Econometrica 59(3), 667-686), which imply asymmetric aversion to gains versus losses. Our dynamic formulation nests the standard CRRA asset allocation problem as a special case. Using realistic data generating processes, we find reasonable equity portfolio allocations for disappointment averse investors with utility functions exhibiting low curvature.

We present an equilibrium production economy in which default occurs in equilibrium. The borrower chooses optimal default and consumption policies, taking into account that default is costly and the lender gains access to the technology upon default. We derive asset prices and default premia in this economy. The borrower's relative risk aversion in wealth increases with decreases in wealth due to the increased possibility of default at low wealth levels. This produces a time-varying pricing kernel and a countercyclical equity premium.

Dispersion in investor beliefs and short-selling constraints can lead to stock market bubbles. This paper argues that firms, unlike investors, can exploit such bubbles by issuing new shares at inflated prices. This lowers the cost of capital and increases real investment. Perhaps surprisingly, large bubbles are not eliminated in equilibrium nor do large bubbles necessarily imply large distortions. Using the variance of analysts?