Decision Making & Negotiations

We develop a model of lending and borrowing in markets where the lender has no access to physical collateral and where the borrower is heavily capital constrained. Our model of micro loans, which incorporates a) the absence of access to physical collateral, b) peer monitoring, c) threat of punishment upon default, and d) costly monitoring by lenders is used to determine the equilibrium borrowing rates. Monitoring by lenders is shown to be critical for an equilibrium to exist in our model if the maturity of the loan is too long.

The role of private equity in global capital markets appears to be expanding at an extraordinary rate. Morgan Stanley estimates that there are now some 2,700 private equity funds that either have raised, or are in the process of raising, a total of $500 billion. With this abundance of available equity capital, the willingness of private equity firms to participate in "club" deals, and the leverage that can be put on top of the equity, private equity buyers now appear able and willing to pay higher prices for assets than ever before.

Many corporate executives view private equity as a last resort, as expensive capital that should be tapped only by companies that don't have access to presumably cheaper public equity. The reality of private equity, however, is more complex, and potentially quite rewarding, for both shareholders and management. This paper surveys some of the academic work on the costs and benefits of public vs. private equity, contrasting the private equity investment process with its public counterpart and exploring how such a process may add value.

Traditional product line positioning and pricing models assume that firms have full information about the market demand and consumer preferences. In this paper we consider a setting where the firm has limited market information and tries to select its product positioning and pricing strategy optimally in light of this missing market information. To do this, we use competitive ration and maximum regret criteria, which measure (respectively) the percentage and absolute loss relative to the benchmark case where the firm has full knowledge of customer preferences.

This 2005 roundtable aimed to present corporate managers and academics with a more accurate picture of how influential and sophisticated investors really think and make decisions. Panelists included Andrew Alford of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Michael Corasaniti of Pequot Capital, Steve Galbraith of Maverick Capital, Mitch Julis of Canyon Capital, Andrew Lacey of Lazard Asset Management, Michael Mauboussin of Legg Mason, Henry McVey of Morgan Stanley, and Stephen Penman of Columbia University. Trevor Harris of Morgan Stanley moderated the discussion.

Design competitions are commissioned for many reasons, almost none of which have to do with design and all of which have to do with political motivations. A political agenda always presides over the important but ancillary search for new design possibilities, innovative solutions, or a compelling architectural or urban vision. Though political agendas vary quite a lot, they are lodged in the fundamental need to create or cultivate a strong constituency and garner the necessary resources to advance a desired project.

Objectives: Significant variation in emergency department (ED) patient arrival rates necessitates the adjustment of staffing patterns to optimize the timely care of patients. This study evaluated the effectiveness of a queueing model in identifying provider staffing patterns to reduce the fraction of patients who leave without being seen.