Financial Accounting & Auditing

This paper compares accounting and finance approaches to equity valuation, with a focus on practical investing. It shows how the two endeavors tie to the same theoretical foundation so they have the potential of being unified. Finance has largely focused on the "denominator" aspect of valuation— the discount rate—under the mantra of "asset pricing" while accounting has largely focused on the numerator; specifying the expected accounting outcomes to be discounted. The paper shows how both accounting and finance can be unified to resolve both the numerator and denominator issue in valuation.

This monograph presents existing and new research on three approaches to multiagent incentives. The goal of all three approaches is to find theories that better explain observed institutions than the standard approach has.

Standard principal-agent models commonly invoked to explain executive pay practices do not account for the involvement of third-party intermediaries in the CEO labor market. This paper investigates the influence of one such intermediary — talent agents who seek out prospective employers and negotiate pay packages on behalf of CEOs. Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) characterize the hiring of such agents as an obvious example of rent extraction by incoming CEOs.

What discount rate should the government use to measure the financial status of various government programs and the impact of potential policy changes? How, if at all, should the discount rate take into account the risk of the underlying cash flows? We examine these questions in the context of one of the largest components of the U.S. budget: Social Security. Official measures of the U.S. Social Security system's present value funding shortfall are computed using the risk-free interest rate.

Contingent capital, a regulatory debt that must convert into common equity when a bank's equity value falls below a specified threshold (a trigger), does not in general lead to a unique equilibrium in the prices of the bank's equity and contingent capital. Multiplicity or absence of equilibrium arises because economic agents are not allowed to choose a conversion policy in their best interests. The lack of unique equilibrium introduces the potential for price manipulation, market uncertainty, inefficient capital allocation, and unreliability of conversion.

This paper investigates the question of whether so-called anomalous returns predicted by accounting numbers are normal returns for risk or abnormal returns. It does so via a model that shows how accounting numbers inform about normal returns if pricing were rational. The model equates expected returns to expectations of earnings and earnings growth, so that any variable that forecasts earnings and earnings growth also forecasts required returns if the market prices those outcomes as risky.

This paper proposes an accounting for revenues as an alternative to the proposals currently begin aired by the FASB and IASB. Existing revenue recognition rules are vague, resulting in messy application, so the Boards are seeking a remedy. However, their proposals replace the traditional criteria — revenue is recognized when it is both "realized or realizable" and "earned" — with similarly vague notions that require both the identification of a "performance obligation" and the "satisfaction" of a performance obligation.

The measurement and timing of reported revenue is critical to performance measurement and the development of accurate forecasting models. GM used incentives to get customers to buy its vehicles. This case asks students to consider how GM should report the sales so that the data is a valid indication of performance and can be used to accurately forecast future sales.

We review accounting principles related to the reporting of marketing activities and evaluate their implications for marketing research and practice. Based on our review, we argue that current accounting practices contribute significantly to the declining influence of marketing within organizations and the rise of myopic management. Financial reports misrepresent marketing contribution and impede its fair assessment. Changes to current marketing accounting practices are needed. Balance sheet recognition of all marketing-related intangibles emerged as the prevailing proposed solution.