Financial Accounting & Auditing

In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal hires an agent to perform a task. The principal cares about the task's output but has no control over it. The agent can perform the task at different effort intensities, and that choice affects the task's output. To provide an incentive to the agent to work hard and since his effort intensity cannot be observed, the principal ties the agent's compensation to the task's output.

Active investors provide entrepreneurs with risk-sharing and value-adding effort, e.g., in form of advising, networking and monitoring. However, holdup problems may create a conflict between two key objectives for high-quality entrepreneurs: to elicit investor effort and to credibly signal their firm type by retaining shares. As a result, pooling of startup firms of different types may arise, in particular when investor effort is essential. More established firms, with access to multiple signals, can always realize both of these objectives.

We document the first systematic evidence on the characteristics and economic consequences of firms subject to employee allegations of corporate financial misdeeds. First, compared to a control group that avoided public whistle-blowing allegations, firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations were characterized by unique firm-specific factors that led employees to expose alleged financial misdeeds.

We investigate whether accounting discretion is (i) abused by opportunistic managers who exploit lax governance structures, or (ii) used by managers in a manner consistent with efficient contracting and shareholder value-maximization. Prior research documents an association between accounting discretion and poor governance quality and concludes that such evidence is consistent with abuse of the latitude allowed by accounting rules.

Under accrual accounting, earnings add to shareholders' equity. Cash flow generated by a business has no effect on the book value of shareholders' equity but reduces the book value of net assets employed in business operations. In short, accrual accounting rules prescribe that earnings add to shareholder value, but cash flow is irrelevant to the valuation of equity. This paper documents that the stock market prices equity shares according to this prescription.

Accounting is often criticized for omitting intangible assets from the balance sheet. This paper points out that the omission is not necessarily a deficiency. There is also an income statement, and the value of intangible (and other) assets can be ascertained from the income statement. Thus, calls for the recognition of "intangible assets" on the balance sheet may be misconceived. The paper lays out the property whereby the income statement corrects for deficiencies in the balance sheet.

In this paper, I use anecdotal evidence and logical reasoning to suggest that, despite the use of an extensive database, it is not possible to conclude that passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act did not have an impact on companies' delisting decisions. Moreover, the instrumental variables used to proxy for SOX effects are too weak and suffer from a significant endogeneity problem given that passage of SOX was driven by many of the economic and control problems that are used to control for market and company factors.