Financial Accounting & Auditing

We examine whether executive stock options (ESOs) provide managers with incentives to invest in risky projects. For a sample of oil and gas producers, we examine whether the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity (our proxy for exploration risk) increases with the sensitivity of the value of the CEO's options to stock return volatility (ESO risk incentives). Both ESO risk incentives and exploration risk are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equations approach.

A pervasive theme in both accounting and statistics is aggregation. However, in contrast to statistics, a customary standard for determining the best aggregation rule in accounting is unavailable or, at least, not explicitly defined. Also, most accounting procedures follow a well-specified recursive algorithm of updating a summarized history number (a beginning balance sheet number) by the current period's activities (changes).

This paper explores “revenue accounting” in contrast to traditional “cost accounting.” Revenue accounting serves the information needs of managers and investors in planning and controlling a firm’s sales activities and their financial consequences, especially in the age of e-commerce. Weaknesses of traditional accounting have become particularly evident recently, for example, the lack of 1) revenue mileposts, 2) revenue sustainability measurements, and 3) intangibles capitalization.

We investigate the relation between dividend changes and future profitability, measured in terms of either future earnings or future abnormal earnings. Supporting "the information content of dividends hypothesis," we find that dividend changes provide information about the level of profitability in subsequent years, incremental to market and accounting data. We also document that dividend changes are positively related to earnings changes in each of the two years after the dividend change.

Did analysts contribute to perpetuating the stock market bubble of 2000? In my view, a considerable analysis during the bubble was suspect. I lay out here what I see as the mistakes, as a matter of historical record. My aim, however, is not just to document the poor thinking during the bubble, but to convey what good, orderly thinking about fundamental value involves—to avoid mistakes in the future.

Financial statement analysis has traditionally been seen as part of the fundamental analysis required for equity valuation. But the analysis has typically been ad hoc. Drawing on recent research on accounting-based valuation, this paper outlines a financial statement analysis for use in equity valuation. Standard profitability analysis is incorporated, and extended, and is complemented with an analysis of growth. An analysis of operating activities is distinguished from the analysis of financing activities. The perspective is one of forecasting payoffs to equities.

We examine the hypothesis that dividend taxes are capitalized into share prices by focusing on investors' implicit valuations of retained earnings versus paid-in equity. Retained earnings are distributable as taxable dividends, whereas paid-in equity is distributable as a tax-free return of capital. Consistent with dividend tax capitalization, firm-level results for the United States indicate that accumulated retained earnings are valued less per unit than contributed capital. In addition, differences in dividend tax rates across U.S.

From the publisher: From the "guru to Wall Street's gurus" comes the fundamental techniques of value investing and their applications. Bruce Greenwald is one of the leading authorities on value investing. Some of the savviest people on Wall Street have taken his Columbia Business School course on the subject. Now this dynamic and popular teacher, with some colleagues, reveals the fundamental principles of value investing, the one investment technique that has proven itself consistently over time.

In this paper I use a principal-agnet framework to explore the relation between the hierarchical structure of firms and the accounting information technologies available to them. My analysis is related to that in Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein [1992] and Ziv [1993]. In this paper, I take an approach that allows the principal to choose the number of layers in the firm, the number of agents in each layer, and the quantity and quality of information in the firm (subject to the available information technology).