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Financial Accounting & Auditing

See the latest research, articles and faculty on the Financial Accounting & Auditing Area of Expertise at Columbia Business School.

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Financial Accounting & Auditing Faculty

Financial Accounting & Auditing Research

A Simpler Mechanism That Stops Agents from Cheating

Authors
Jonathan Glover
Date
February 1, 1994
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Journal of Economic Theory

This note considers a principal–multi-agent model of a firm subject to adverse selection. With just the usual optimal (incentive-constrained) contracts being offered, there exist multiple (Bayes–Nash) equilibria in the agents' subgame. Moreover, from the agents' perspective, there exists an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium desired by the principal. By exploiting the structure of the model, this note develops a new approach for eliminating unwanted equilibria (while retaining the desired equilibrium).

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Should Taxpayers Be Subsidized to Hire Third-Party Preparers? A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Authors
Mark Wolfson, Nahum Melumad, and Amir Ziv
Date
January 1, 1994
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Contemporary Accounting Research

This article examines the tax-compliance game between taxpayers, a tax-collecting agency, and third-party tax-return prepares. In our model, taxpayers are uncertain about their taxable income and may hire tax practitioners to reduce tax uncertainty. We examine the viability of tax practitioners as a signaling device (taking into account the effects on the behavior of the tax-collecting agency) and investigate the desirability of encouraging (or discouraging) the use of tax practitioners via the use of alternative tax-crediting rules.

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The Value Relevance of German Accounting Measures: An Empirical Analysis

Authors
Trevor Harris, M. Lang, and H. P. Möller
Date
January 1, 1994
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Journal of Accounting Research

In this study we compare the value relevance of accounting measures for U.S. and German firms matched on industry and firm size, and evaluate the incremental informativeness of earnings adjusted on the basis of a formula proposed by analysts.

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A Comparison of the Value-Relevance of U.S. versus Non-U.S. GAAP Accounting Measures Using Form 20-F Reconciliations

Authors
Trevor Harris and E. Venuti
Date
January 1, 1993
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Journal of Accounting Research

Firms registered outside the United States and listed on a primary U.S. exchange may provide their U.S. shareholders with financial statements prepared under their domestic (non-U.S.) generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The Securities and Exchange Commission requires such firms to reconcile their reported earnings and shareholders' equity to U.S. GAAP as part of a Form 20-F filing. These reconciliations provide a set of precise measures of the differences created by alternative accounting practices.

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Price-Earnings and Price-to-Book Anomalies: Tests of an Intrinsic Value Explanation

Authors
Trevor Harris and P. M. Fairfield
Date
January 1, 1993
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Contemporary Accounting Research

Price deviations from basic valuation models based on accounting earnings and book value of owners' equity are used to test the intrinsic value explanation of the price-earnings and price-book value anomalies. Relative price deviations from the implied benchmark prices are used to assign years into high and low deviation groups. Traditional zero investment hedge portfolios are formed in each year, and the returns are compared across high and low deviation years.

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Ponzi Games

Authors
Stephen O'Connell and Stephen Zeldes
Date
January 1, 1992
Format
Chapter
Book
New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance

Writing for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, Stephen Zeldes and Stephen O'Connell trace the history of the term "Ponzi Games" and define it as "a situation in which a borrower rolls over debt perpetually, covering all interest and/or principal repayments with additional borrowing. " They illustrate why a perpetual flow of new lenders is necessary to a Ponzi game, and discuss the link between Ponzi games and phenomena such as valued fiat money, asset price bubbles, and dynamic efficiency.

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Aggregate Accounting Earnings Can Explain Most of Security Returns: The Case of Long Return Intervals

Authors
Peter Easton, Trevor Harris, and James A. Ohlson
Date
January 1, 1992
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Journal of Accounting and Economics

The paper analyzes the contemporaneous association between market returns and earnings for long return intervals. The research design exploits two fundamental accounting attributes: (i) earnings aggregate over periods, and (ii) expanding the interval over which earnings are determined, is likely to reduce "measurement errors" in (aggregate) earnings. These concepts lead to the level of (aggregate) earnings as a natural earnings variable for explaining security returns.

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Return to Fundamentals

Authors
Stephen Penman
Date
January 1, 1992
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance

This article outlines research developments that reconcile both fundamental analysis and accounting measurement to the modern theory of valuation. Three features of accounting suggest it may play a role. First, it has the nominal attributes of a value measurement system. The financial accounting process is focused on tracking the book value of equity or net worth. The final entry in the periodic accounting cycle is the close to book values.

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Disaggregated Accounting Data as Explanatory Variables for Returns

Authors
James Ohlson and Stephen Penman
Date
January 1, 1992
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance

This article explores the differential measurement problems related to the earnings components by invoking the standard errors-in-variables perspective on estimated coefficients. A more traditional way of looking at accounting recognizes the process as one of measurements. That is, the analysis of transactions leads to line items in the financial statements, which in turn aggregate into the bottom line numbers: earnings and book value. The disclosures of the line items clearly suggest that the accountant is aware of the insufficiency of earnings and book values as determinants of values.

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