Macroeconomics

We develop a general equilibrium model of frictional labor reallocation across firms and regions, and use it to quantify the aggregate and distributional effects of spatial frictions that hinder worker mobility across regions in Germany. The model leverages matched employer-employee data to unpack spatial frictions into different types while isolating them from labor market frictions that operate also within region.

According to the Lucas-Stokey result, a government can structure its debt maturity to guarantee commitment to optimal fiscal policy by future governments. In this paper, we overturn this conclusion, showing that it does not generally hold in the same model and under the same definition of time-consistency as in Lucas-Stokey. Our argument rests on the existence of an overlooked commitment problem that cannot be remedied with debt maturity: a government in the future will not necessarily tax above the peak of the Laffer curve, even if it is ex-ante optimal to do so.

We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for mechanism design with limited commitment. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the payoffs of any equilibrium in a mechanism-selection game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. A cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information the designer obtains from the interaction with the agent.

Using rich administrative and household survey data, we document a series of new facts on earnings inequality and dynamics in a developing country with a large informal sector: Brazil. Since the mid-1990s, both inequality and volatility of earnings have declined significantly in Brazil's formal sector. Higher-order moments of the distribution of earnings innovations show cyclical movements in Brazil that are similar to those in developed countries like the US. Earnings mobility is comparatively high, especially at the bottom of the distribution.

This paper studies earnings inequality and dynamics in Argentina between 1996 and 2015. Following the 2001-2002 crisis, the Argentine economy transitioned from a low- to a high-inflation regime. At the same time, the number of collective bargaining agreements increased and the minimum wage adjustments became more frequent. We document that this macroeconomic transition was associated with a persistent decrease in the dispersion of real earnings and cyclical movements in higher-order moments of the distribution of earnings innovations.

We estimate the time-varying distribution of aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD) shocks. We distinguish between traditional Gaussian uncertainty and "bad" uncertainty, associated with negative skewness. The Great Moderation is driven by a reduction in the volatility of AS shocks and the Gaussian component of AD shocks. The increased role of "bad" demand uncertainty implies that the conditional skewness of GDP growth and inflation has decreased over time. The correlation between AS/AD shocks and shocks to their conditional volatilities is generally strongly negative.

The Chinese earnings yield differential relative to the U.S. switches from negative to positive around 2009, with the aggregate variation masking substantial cross-sector variation. Changes in sectoral composition and (changing) growth expectations are not important determinants of the variation in China-U.S. valuation differentials. Instead, changes in ownership structure, and most importantly cross-sectional and temporal variation in financial openness, are the key contributors.

Economic theory suggests that leaders may play key roles in enabling social movements to overcome collective action problems through a variety of distinct mechanisms. Empirical tests of these theories outside the lab are scarce due to both measurement and identification challenges. We conduct multiple field experiments to test theories of leadership in the context of Myanmar's burgeoning labor union movement. We collaborate with a confederation of labor unions as it mobilizes garment workers in the run-up to a national minimum wage negotiation. We present three sets of results.