Macroeconomics

Along with its interrelated companion volume, The Content, Impact, and Regulation of Streaming Video, this book covers the next generation of TV—streaming online video, with details about its present and a broad perspective on the future. It reviews the new technical elements that are emerging, both in hardware and software, their long-term trend, and the implications. It discusses the emerging ‘media cloud’ of video and infrastructure platforms, and the organizational form of such TV.

We document that governments whose local currency debt provides them with greater hedging benefits actually borrow more in foreign currency. We introduce two features into a government's debt portfolio choice problem to explain this finding: risk-averse lenders and lack of monetary policy commitment. A government without commitment chooses excessively countercyclical inflation ex post, which leads risk-averse lenders to require a risk premium ex ante.

Since 1980, economic growth in the U.S. has been fastest in its largest cities. We show that a group of skill- and information-intensive service industries are responsible for all of this new urban bias in recent growth. We then propose a simple explanation centered around the interaction of three factors: the disproportionate reliance of these services on information and communication technology (ICT), the precipitous price decline for ICT capital since 1980, and the preexisting comparative advantage of cities in skilled services.

We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive-form vary. An analyst may know the payoff-relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extenstive-form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive-form with some information structure.

A principal faces an agent who is better informed but biased toward higher actions. She can verify the agent's information and specify his permissible actions. We show that if the verification cost is small enough, a threshold with an escape clause (TEC) is optimal: the agent either chooses an action below a threshold or requests verification and the efficient action above the threshold. For higher costs, however, the principal may require verification only for intermediate actions, dividing the delegation set.

We study the nature of firm pay dynamics using matched employer-employee and firm financials data from Sweden. To this end, we propose and estimate a statistical model that extends the seminal framework by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999b) to account for idiosyncratically time-varying firm pay policies. We validate the model by showing that firm-year pay estimates are systematically related to measures of firm performance.

We recover valuations of time using detailed data from a large ride-hail platform, where drivers bid on trips and consumers choose between a set of rides with different prices and waiting times. We estimate demand as a function of prices and waiting times and find that price elasticities are substantially higher than waiting-time elasticities. We show how these estimates can be mapped into values of time that vary by place, person, and time of day. We find that the value of time during non-work hours is 16% lower than during work hours.

Companies that freeze defined benefit pension plans save the equivalent of 13.5% of the long-horizon payroll of current employees. Furthermore, firms with higher prospective accruals are more likely to freeze their plans. Cost savings would not be possible in a benchmark model in which i) all workers receive compensation equal to their marginal product and ii) workers value equally all identical-cost forms of pension benefits.

We document that a large share of the gender pay gap in Brazil is due to women working at lower-paying employers. At the same time, women's revealed-preference ranking of employers is less increasing in pay compared to that of men. To interpret these facts, we develop an empirical equilibrium search model with endogenous gender differences in pay, amenities, and recruiting intensities across employers.