Organizations & Markets

Does private regulation work to provide and preserve collective benefits, and if so, when? To answer these questions, we focus on social structure and competitive exclusion. We argue that effective private regulation depends on social structures that support normative control of interested parties. However, competitive dynamics may transform private regulation into an instrument to defend the interest of institutional incumbents.

We examine early approaches to the agency problem by asking when captains owned ships in eigheenth and nineteenth century shipping, and how captain-ownership effected voyage success. For each ship we observe the identity of the owners, the identity of the ship captain, the route pursued for each voyage, and various outcome measures for each voyage. We also have information on vessel construction characteristics, the sailing history of each vessel, and the occupations of the owners.

In this chapter, I describe the coordinates of the global application of public-private partnerships (PPP) and identify central commonalities of sector collaboration for both infrastructure development and urban redevelopment/regeneration projects. The comparison across these two types of "hard" asset-based initiatives will, I hope, highlight the central issues of implementation and underscore the need for policymakers to address the nature of risk sharing, which I believe is central to the PPP strategy at the project level.

When the removal of trade barriers coincides with the elimination of inefficient institutions created to manage them, the gains from trade increase. We investigate the change in productivity associated with the removal of quotas on Chinese textile and clothing exporters as well as the elimination of the export licensing regime which managed quota allocation. When quotas were removed in 2005, Chinese export value and quantity surged and export prices declined.

The measurement and timing of reported revenue is critical to performance measurement and the development of accurate forecasting models. GM used incentives to get customers to buy its vehicles. This case asks students to consider how GM should report the sales so that the data is a valid indication of performance and can be used to accurately forecast future sales.

This paper investigates the impact of the introduction of new orphan drugs on premature mortality from rare diseases using longitudinal, disease-level data obtained from a number of major databases. The analysis is performed using data from two countries: the U.S. (during the period 1999-2006) and France (during the period 2000-2007).

In this chapter, Kenneth Ayotte and Patrick Bolton model the role that mandatory standardization plays in reducing the costs of financial contracting and improving liquidity. In particular, they identify opportunities for financial contractors to appropriate value from unknowing third parties and show that rules that standardize contracts can serve as a commitment device against such demand-dampening pitfalls facing these other parties. Mandatory standardization thereby can improve the liquidity of secondary markets from loan contracts.