Organizations & Markets

We consider a setting where a firm delegates an investment decision and, subsequently, a sales decision to a privately informed manager. For both decisions corporate income taxes have real effects. We show that compensating the manager based on pre-tax residual income can ensure after-tax NPV-maximization ("goal congruence") for each decision problem in isolation. However, this metric fails if both decisions are nontrivial, since it requires asset-specific hurdle rates and hence precludes asset aggregation.

This paper studies the capital budgeting process in a setting where a manager is privately informed about the profitability of an investment project and enjoys nonpecuniary benefits of control ("empire benefits"). I characterize the optimal required rate of return and show that a delegation scheme with residual income-based compensation can replicate the benchmark performance achieved under centralization. The main result of the paper is that the optimal capital charge rate for computing residual income always exceeds the required rate of return as a result of empire benefits.

This paper analyzes the issue costs and initial pricing of bonds in the international market. In particular, we investigate the determinants of three components of issue costs: underwriter fee, underwriter spread (the difference between the offering price and the guaranteed price to the issuer), and underpricing (the difference between the market price and the offering price). Total underwriter compensation increases with the bonds’ credit risk and maturity, but it is insignificantly related to issue size.

Much has been said about the failing policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this essay, I attempt to explain why the IMF has pursued policies that in many cases not only failed to promote the stated objectives of enhancing growth and stability, but were probably counterproductive and even flew in the face of a considerable body of theoretical and empirical work that suggested these policies would be counterproductive. I argue that the root of the problem lies in the IMF's system of governance.

From the publisher:From the author of Globalization and Its Discontents comes a history of the boom and bust of the 1990s - how and why it happened, how the seeds of destruction were sown in the midst of apparent prosperity, and how America and the world are still failing to learn the lessons from what went wrong. One reason the invisible hand of market economics may be invisible is that it may not exist. So says former World Bank economist Stiglitz in his analysis of what went wrong with the economic boom and bust of the 1990s.

The chapter has two main sections. The first one describes various violations of the Law of One Price. The section that follow it considers a related, but very different and fundamental issue: Why do people trade?

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Emerging markets have long posed a challenge for finance. Standard models are often ill suited to deal with the specific circumstances arising in these markets. However, the interest in emerging markets has provided impetus for both the adaptation of current models to new circumstances in these markets and the development of new models. The model of market integration and segmentation is our starting point. Next, we emphasize the distinction between market liberalization and integration. We explore the financial effects of market integration as well as the impact on the real economy.

<p>Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examine the comparative corporate governance literature.

There is a long normative 'Social Contract' tradition that attempts to characterize ex-post income in equalities that are agreeable to all 'behind a veil of ignorance.' This paper takes a similar normative approach to characterize social decision-making procedures. It is shown that quite generally some form of majority-voting is preferred to unanimity 'behind a veil of ignorance' whenever society faces dead weight costs in making compensating transfers.