Research Lab

To understand why developing countries do not automatically benefit from financial globalization, both the need for a minimum institutional quality (the threshold hypothesis) and the possibility of varying volatility of different types of capital flows (the composition hypothesis) have been suggested. This paper contends that the two hypotheses are intimately linked, and provides supportive empirical evidence.

This paper investigates the interaction between synergies and internal agency conflicts that emerges endogenously in multi-division firms. A divisional manager's entrenchment choice depends directly on the specificity of her division's assets, because the specificity governs whether entrenchment activities reduce the likelihood of her division being divested. The presence of synergies, by modifying the difference between the value of assets in their current use and in alternative uses, may alter the divisional manager's entrenchment incentive.

This paper yields a summary score that informs about the sustainability (or persistence) of earnings and about the trailing P/E ratio. The score is delivered from a model that identifies unsustainable earnings from the financial statements by exploiting accounting relations that require that unsustainable earnings leave a trail in the accounts. The paper also builds a P/E model that recognizes that investors buy future earnings, so should pay less for current earnings if those earnings cannot be sustained in the future.

Multidivisional firms frequently rely on external market prices in order to value internal transactions across profit centers. This paper examines the transfer pricing problem in a setting in which an upstream division has monopoly power in selling a proprietary component both to a downstream division within the same firm and to external customers. When internal transfers are valued at the prevailing market price, the resulting transactions are distorted by double marginalization.

We show that the accrual anomaly documented by Sloan (1996) [Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71: 289–315] is concentrated in firms with high idiosyncratic stock return volatility making it risky for risk-averse arbitrageurs to take positions in stocks with extreme accruals. Moreover, the accrual anomaly is found in low-price and low-volume stocks, suggesting that transaction costs impose further barriers to exploiting accrual mispricing.

Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems, ignoring the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. This paper develops a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns taking the form of cash and "empire benefits." Owners of a vertically integrated firm then will provide division managers with low-powered incentives so as to induce them to bargain "more cooperatively," resulting in higher investments and overall profit as compared with non-integration.

Valuation models are useful tools, but they need to be handled with care. When taking the form of mathematical formulas, they can easily be made to convey a false sense of precision. In particular, selective choice of long-term growth rates and discount rates can be used to justify almost any desired valuation.

Although agency theory suggests that firms should index executive compensation to remove market-wide effects (i.e., RPE), there is little evidence to support this theory. Oyer (2004, Journal of Finance 59, 1619–1649) posits that an absence of RPE is optimal if the CEO's reservation wages from outside employment opportunities vary with the economy's fortunes. We directly test and find support for Oyer's (2004) theory. We argue that the CEO's outside opportunities depend on his talent, as proxied by the CEO's financial press visibility and his firm's industry-adjusted ROA.

America's health care system is the envy of the world, but it faces serious challenges. The costs of care are rising rapidly, the number of uninsured Americans is at an all-time high, and public dissatisfaction is steadily increasing. How can we preserve the strengths of our current system while correcting its weaknesses? Three of American's leading health-care scholars answer that question in Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise. Poorly conceived federal tax policies, insurance regulations, and barriers to entry have distorted health-care markets and inhibited competition.