Research Lab

The Millennium Date Change (often referred to as Y2K) was anticipated to be a major liquidity event by many financial and corporate institutions as well as the central banks around the world. The timing of the event was foreseeable and thus satisfies the assumptions in the economic theory on public provision of private liquidity. We apply the theory to understand the liquidity premium in financial markets and the actions of the U.S. central bank in the period surrounding Y2K.

This paper explores the motivations and desirability of off-balance sheet financing of credit card receivables by banks. We explore three related issues: the degree to which securitizations result in the transfer of risk out of the originating bank, the extent to which securitization permits banks to economize on capital by avoiding regulatory minimum capital requirements, and whether banks'' avoidance of minimum capital regulation through securitization with implicit recourse has been undesirable from a regulatory standpoint.

In a contingent claims framework, with a single issue of debt and full information, we show that the presence of a bankruptcy code with automatic stay, absolute priority rules, and potential debt forgiveness, can lead to significant conflicts of interest between the borrowers and lenders. In the first-best outcome, the code can add significant value to both parties by way of higher debt capacity, lower spreads, and improvement in the overall value of the firm.

We model the trade-off between low-asset risk and low leverage to satisfy preferences for low-risk deposits and apply it to interwar New York City banks. During the 1920s, profitable lending and low costs of raising capital produced increased bank asset risk and increased capital, with no deposit risk change. Differences in the costs of raising equity explain differences in asset risk and capital ratios. In the 1930s, rising deposit default risk led to deposit withdrawals. In response, banks increased riskless assets and cut dividends.

This paper examines transfer pricing in multinational firms when individual divisions face different income tax rates. Assuming that a firm decouples its internal transfer price from the arm's length price used for tax purposes, we analyze the effectiveness of alternative pricing rules under both cost- and market-based transfer pricing. In a tax-free world, Hirshleifer (1956) advocated that the internal transfer price be set equal to the marginal cost of the supplying division.

The question of whether higherlifetime income households save a larger fraction of their income was the subject of much debate in the 1950s and 1960s, and while not resolved, it remains central to the evaluation of tax and macroeconomic policies. We resolve this long-standing question using new empirical methods applied to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the Survey of Consumer Finances, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey.

Recent corporate scandals and the dramatic decline in the stock market since March 2000 have increased concerns about conflicts of interest in the financial services industry. In a new ICMB/CEPR Report, four leading financial economists analyse what conflicts of interest are and why we care about them, and develop a framework for evaluating policies to remedy them.

The front-page corporate scandals that erupted in the U.S. economy beginning in 2001—Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, HealthSouth, and others—have undermined confidence in the U.S. business system and raised questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance in the United States.

This paper provides an overview of the regulation of hedge funds and examines the key regulatory issues that now confront regulators throughout the world. In particular, two major issues are examined. First, whether hedge funds pose a systemic threat to the stability of financial markets, and if so, whether additional government regulation would be useful. And second, whether existing regulation provides sufficient protection for hedge fund investors, and, if not, what additional regulation is needed.