Corporate Finance

An analysis of 1979-1984 panel data for 169 US defense industry firms shows that the federal government promotes research and development (R&D) investment by awarding major contracts through the competitive procurement process. In this process, the government reveals its demand for certain technological innovations and encourages private firms to sponsor the necessary R&D. The firms will recover the R&D expenses by being awarded the government contract.

This paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation. In this theory, suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable actions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past. We develop a model to establish the cases in which simple contracts cannot achieve desirable outcomes, so that only a complicated contract or renegotiation will serve. Unlike most previous accounts of contract renegotiation, this theory does not rely on exogenous uncertainty to motive renegotiation.

This paper develops and implements a technique for estimating a model of the bid/ask spread. The spread is decomposed into two components, one due to asymmetric information and one due to inventory costs, specialist monopoly power, and clearing costs. The model is estimated using NYSE common stock transaction prices in the period 1981-1983. Cross-sectional regression analysis is then used to relate time-series estimated spread components to other stock characteristics.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom that dividends are the primary means of transferring cash from the firm to its shareholders, nondividend cash payments surpassed dividends in the two most recent years for which data are available, 1984 and 1985 (Shoven 1986). This development challenges the "trapped-equity" cost of capital models 'which equate the cost of retained earnings to the after-tax yield of the alternative considered, namely, dividends.

The bid-ask spread can be decomposed into two parts: one part due to asymmetric information and the other part due to other factors such as monopoly power. The part due to asymmetric information attenuates statistical biases in mean return, variance, and serial covariance. Thus, using spread data to adjust for biases in return moments requires knowing not only the spread but the composition of the spread. Furthermore, any spread-estimation procedure using transaction prices must estimate two spread components.

This paper studies the relation between Value Line's successful record in predicting relative stock price movements and the firm size effect. The data suggest little direct relation between the two phenomena. Value Line tends not to rank small firm stocks, and small firm stocks that are ranked are more likely to receive a low rank than large firm stocks. Within each size-sorted quintile of the market, the mean payoffs on costless positions constructed according to Value Line's recommendations are positive.

The authors propose a likelihood-ratio test of the hypothesis that the minimum-variance frontier of a set of K assets coincides with the frontier of this set and another set of N assets. They study the relation between this hypothesis, exact arbitrage pricing, and mutual fund separation. The exact distribution of the test statistic is available. The authors test the hypothesis that the frontier spanned by three size-sorted stock portfolios is the same as the frontier spanned by thirty-three size-sorted stock portfolios.

It is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long-tern contracts that prevent the entry of some lower-cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely. Moreover, when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry, it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry.

Written for graduate students, researchers and professionals in international finance and academia, this book provides a useful foundation for future research in developing quantitative measures of risk and expected return in international finance. After a discussion of a general rational expectations asset pricing model, Hodrick considers the development and implementation of econometric tests of various hypotheses that have been offered as candidate characterizations of efficiency in foreign exchange markets.