This paper examines the allocative role of class shares that pay dividends based upon the performance of the individual activities of multi-activity firms. The firms considered operate under economies of scope and technological uncertainty in an incomplete asset market. Investor unanimity about the choice of production plans and a constrained Pareto optimum are attained when all firms in the economy issue a class of shares for each of their activities.
Demandable-debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension, liquidation, and idle reserve holdings. An explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive-compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors. Demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation. Its usefulness in transacting follows from information-sharing between monitors and nonmonitors.
The traditional pricing methodology in finance values derivative securities as redundant assets that have no impact on equilibrium prices and allocations. This paper demonstrates that when the market is incomplete primary and derivative asset markets, generically, interact: the valuation of derivative and primary securities is a simultaneous pricing problem and primary security prices depend on the contractual characteristics of the derivative assets available.
The nature of supply curves in corporate equity are examined. Until recently, there has been little direct empirical assessment of their elasticity. At issue is whether or not the supposition of shareholder homogeneity of valuations represents a good approximation to actual markets. In Bagwell (1990), supply curves documented in Dutch auction repurchases have a distinct upward slope. Shleifer (1990) also provides evidence of an upward-sloping supply curve.
Japan's capital markets have played a crucial role in the recent increase in the globalization of international capital markets. As a result it has become important to understand the similarities and differences in the way Japanese markets operate in comparison to the more familiar Anglo-American environment. One of the major differences that has attracted a great deal of attention is the relatively high average price/earnings [PE] ratio (Viner [1988]) for the stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
We argue that although decentralization has advantages in finding low-cost solutions, these advantages are accompanied by coordination problems, which lead to delay or duplication of effort or both. Consequently, decentralization is desirable when there is little urgency or a great deal of private information, but it is strictly undesirable in urgent problems when private information is less important. We also examine the effect of large numbers and find that coordination problems disappear in the limit if distributions are common knowledge.
By committing to terminate funding if a firm's performance is poor, investors can mitigate managerial incentive problems. These optimal financial constraints, however, encourage rivals to ensure that a firm's performance is poor; this raises the chance that the financial constraints become binding and induce exit. We analyze the optimal financial contract in light of this predatory threat. The optimal contract balances the benefits of deterring predation by relaxing financial constraints against the cost of exacerbating incentive problems. (JEL 610)