Corporate Finance

The article presents a study using the Euler equation for capital accumulation by individual business firms. First, authors' use an estimation strategy based on the Euler equation representation of firms' investment decisions. This strategy reflects reservations with standard investment models based on the q theory with adjustment costs. In particular, there are well-known problems in measuring marginal q, as well as concerns that observed stock market valuations may not accord with the predictions of the efficient markets hypothesis.

Examines how the benefits to managers of corporate control affect the relationship between managerial ownership and the stock returns of acquiring firms. Examination of mergers between 1985 and 1991; Characteristics of agency costs to equity in various levels of managerial ownership.

We improve upon existing approaches used to estimate investment models by exploiting tax reforms as "natural experiments." we find that tax policy has an economically important effect through the user cost of capital on firms' equipment investment following major tax reforms enacted in 1962, 1971, 1981, and 1986. This effect is most pronounced for firms not in tax loss positions and, thus, more likely to face statutory tax rates and investment incentives.

This article addresses the problem of valuing American call options with caps on dividend-paying assets. Since early exercise is allowed, the valuation problem requires the determination of optimal exercise policies. Options with two types of caps are analyzed: constant caps and caps with a constant growth rate. For constant caps, it is optimal to exercise at the first time at which the underlying asset's price equals or exceeds the minimum of the cap and the optimal exercise boundary for the corresponding uncapped option.

The purpose of this study was to determine the significance of differences between revised IASC standards (extant in 1994) and U.S. GAAP. With the assistance of Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P., the author restated the group accounts of a sample of eight companies in a variety of industries: six Continental European companies and two companies based in Australia and New Zealand. The companies' annual reports for 1992 or 1993, as supplemented by research conducted by the companies themselves, were used to construct reconciliation tables between the revised IASC standards and U.S. GAAP.

This paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information. Communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others. Agents can reduce this time by specializingin the processing ofparticular types ofinformation. When these returns to specialization outweigh costsofcommunication, it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm.

To explore if, when, and how intentionally corporate officers conceal negative organizational outcomes from shareholders, we used computer-assisted content analysis of over 1,000 president's letters contained in annual reports to shareholders. Results suggest that outside directors, large institutional investors, and accountants limit such concealment, but small institutional investors and outside directors who are shareholders prompt it. Low disclosure is associated with subsequent selling of stock by top officers and outside directors.

Under fairly general conditions, the article derives the equilibrium price schedule determined by the bids and offers in an open limit order book.