Corporate Finance

Knowledge of the one-month interest rate is useful in forecasting the sign as well as the variance of the excess return on stocks. The services of a portfolio manager who makes use of the forecasting model to shift funds between bills and stocks would be worth an annual management fee of 2 percent of the value of the assets managed. During 1954:4 to 1986:12, the variance of monthly returns on the managed portfolio was about 60 percent of the variance of the returns on the value weighted index, whereas the average return was two basis points higher.

This paper performs a financial statement analysis that combines a large set of financial statement items into one summary measure which indicates the direction of one-year-ahead earnings changes. Positions are taken in stocks on the basis of this measure during the period 1973–1983, which involve canceling long and short positions with zero net investment. The two-year holding-period return to the long and short positions is in the order of 12.5%. After adjustment for "size effects" the return is about 7.0%. These returns cannot be explained by nominated firm risk characteristics.

This paper examines the properties of a market solution to the output uncertainty problem faced by unincorporated primary producers. An insurance contract is formulated and shown to provide income insurance to producers without exposing insurers to moral hazard. The equilibrium relative to this contract is shown to be equivalent to that effected by a stock market available to all producers.

Several recent studies have suggested that empirical rejections of the permanent income/life cycle model might be due to the existence of liquidity constraints. This paper tests the permanent income hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis that consumers optimize subject to a well-specified sequence of borrowing constraints. Implications for consumption in the presence of borrowing constraints are derived and then tested using time-series/cross-section data on families from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.

Trading on private information creates inefficiencies because there is less than optimal risk sharing. This occurs because the response of market makers to the existence of traders with private information is to reduce the liquidity of the market. The institution of the monopolist specialist may ease this inefficiency somewhat by increasing the liquidity of the market. While competing market makers will expect a zero profit on every trade, the monopolist will average his profits across trades. This implies a more liquid market when there is extensive trading on private information.

This article looks at the alternative methods that can be employed by firms with regards to rewarding equity holders. Economists have long been puzzled by why firms pay dividends when alternative methods of rewarding shareholders and financiers exist which involve less taxes. Dividend paying equity appears to be the most heavily taxed capital instrument available. It is subject to two levels of taxation: first, the federal corporation income tax (set at a 34 percent marginal rate in the U.S. as of June 1989) and second, the personal income tax if the shares are owned by households.

In this paper we show that information in prices that leads (future) earnings is contained in financial statements. While accrual accounting rules produce an earnings number which reflects the information in stock prices with a lag, they also produce a large array of additional numbers presented in the income statement, balance sheet, and statement of changes in financial position. We demonstrate that certain of these numbers can be summarized into one measure that predicts future earnings.

Most U.S. corporations choose their fiscal years to coincide with the calendar year. We document that the larger the firm, the more likely it is to begin its fiscal year in January. This finding holds across industries.