Corporate Governance

We propose the standard neoclassical model of investment under uncertainty with short-run adjustment frictions as a benchmark for earnings-return patterns absent accounting influences. We show that our proposed benchmark generates a wide range of earnings-return patterns documented in prior accounting research. Notably, our model generates a concave earnings-return relation, similar to that of Basu [1997], and predicts that the earnings-return concavity increases in the volatility of firms' underlying shock processes and decreases in investment levels.

What does it take for success in the media business? Creativity, innovation, and performance, of course. Plus experience and good judgment. However, it also requires an understanding of the principles and tools of management. This book summarizes the major dimensions of a business school curriculum and applies them to the entire media, media-tech, and digital sectors. Its chapters cover—in a jargonless, non-technical way—the major management functions.

Being a successful manager or entrepreneur in the media and digital sector requires creativity, innovation, and performance. It also requires an understanding of the principles and tools of management. Aimed at the college market, this book is a short, foundational volume on media management. It summarizes the major dimensions of a business school curriculum and applies them to the entire media, media-tech, and digital sector. Its chapters cover—in a jargonless, non-technical way—the major functions of management.

Using the staggered adoption of universal demand (UD) laws in the United States, we study the effect of shareholder litigation risk on corporate disclosure. We find that disclosure significantly increases after UD laws make it more difficult to file derivative lawsuits. Specifically, firms issue more earnings forecasts and voluntary 8-K filings, and increase the length of management discussion and analysis (MD&A) in their 10-K filings. We further assess the direct and indirect channels through which UD laws affect firms' disclosure policies.

We examine the effects of financial reporting regulation on firms' banking. Exploiting discontinuous public disclosure and auditing requirements assigned to otherwise similar small and medium-sized private firms, we document that financial reporting regulation reduces firms' reliance on concentrated and local bank relationships and increases banks' reliance on firms' financial reporting, consistent with a shift in firms' banking from relationship toward transactional approaches.

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist's target.

In a dynamic setting with demand following a random process, we ask how investment and operating decisions can be delegated to a manager with unknown time preferences. Only the manager observes the demand realization in each period and, therefore, has private information when choosing whether to acquire the productive asset and, subsequently, how to utilize it. We derive accrual accounting-based performance measures under which the manager will make the efficient decisions provided the investment date is exogenously given.

Firms often use both objective/verifiable and subjective/non-verifiable performance measures to provide employees with effort incentives. We study a principal/two-agent model in which an objective team-based performance measure and subjective individual performance measures are available for contracting. A problem with tying rewards to subjective measures is that the principal may have incentives to understate the realization of those measures in order to reduce compensation. We compare two mechanisms for overcoming this credibility problem: bonus pools and reputation.

It is not every day that one is asked a question that is so critical to the sustenance and well-being of such a material percentage of the developed world.  Over the last century, it can be said that western society has evolved to incorporate the notion of a pension as an ideal. Just this past summer it was not inconceivable that Greece would leave the European Union. Why?