Decision Making & Negotiations

Although established money managers operate in an environment which seems com- petitive, they also seem to be very profitable. The present value of the expected future profits from managing a collection of funds is equal to the value of the assets under management times the profit margin, assuming that the managed funds will remain in business forever, zero asset flow into and out of the funds, zero excess returns net of trading costs, fixed management fee proportional to the assets under management and a fixed profit margin for the management company.

Active investors provide entrepreneurs with risk-sharing and value-adding effort, e.g., in form of advising, networking and monitoring. However, holdup problems may create a conflict between two key objectives for high-quality entrepreneurs: to elicit investor effort and to credibly signal their firm type by retaining shares. As a result, pooling of startup firms of different types may arise, in particular when investor effort is essential. More established firms, with access to multiple signals, can always realize both of these objectives.

This paper examines optimal sampling and pricing of information goods for firms that generate revenues from both sales and advertising. We develop a model where the demand for paid information goods is influenced by the sample portion that the firm offers for free. Taking into account the consumers’ initial valuation and experienced quality of the free version, we characterize the firm’s optimal sampling and pricing decisions. We find that the effect of advertising revenues on optimal sample portion and price depends on expected and experienced quality.

In this chapter, DeVoe and Iyengar argue that the perceived fairness of different allocation norms (e.g., equity and equality) depends on the resource being allocated. In particular, they argue that people have a greater preference for allocating resources equitably when the resource to be allocated is money (or other easily monetized goods) relative to nonmonetized goods.

The fields of statistics and econometrics have developed powerful methods for testing the validity (specification) of a model based on its fit to underlying data. Unlike statisticians, managers are typically more interested in the performance of a decision rather than the statistical validity of the underlying model. We propose a framework and a statistical test that incorporates decision performance into a measure of statistical validity. Under general conditions on the objective function, asymptotic behavior of our test admits a sharp and simple characterization.

The authors test methods, based on cognitively simple decision rules, that predict which products consumers select for their consideration sets. Drawing on qualitative research, the authors propose disjunctions-of-conjunctions (DOC) decision rules that generalize well-studied decision models, such as disjunctive, conjunctive, lexicographic, and subset conjunctive rules. They propose two machine-learning methods to estimate cognitively simple DOC rules. They observe consumers' consideration sets for global positioning systems for both calibration and validation data.

In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal hires an agent to perform a task. The principal cares about the task's output but has no control over it. The agent can perform the task at different effort intensities, and that choice affects the task's output. To provide an incentive to the agent to work hard and since his effort intensity cannot be observed, the principal ties the agent's compensation to the task's output.

We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a broad class of competition models in which the competing firms' market shares are given by an attraction model, and the aggregate sales in the industry depend on the aggregate attraction value according to a general function. Each firm's revenues and costs are proportional with its expected sales volume, with a cost rate that depends on the firm's chosen attraction value according to an arbitrary increasing function.