Organizations & Markets

Competing organizations are often defined by their niche overlap or structural equivalence in resource dependence, but the very structure that defines competitors can also identify cooperators. There is a fine line between competition and cooperation, but current theories give insufficient guidance as to which will take place and also contribute to the belief that cooperation between competitors is illegitimate. We show that the legitimacy of these practices, as well the evaluation of their welfare implications, are context bound.

We analyze data on fees paid to investment bankers and acquisition premia paid for targets in cash tender offers. Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of a benign view of the role of investment banks in advising acquisition targets. Fees to investment banks are correlated with attributes of transactions and target firms in ways that make sense if banks are being paid for processing information. The more contingent (and, therefore, risky) the fees, the higher they tend to be, all else held constant.

We match Big Mac prices with prices of its ingredients as a unique prism to study real exchange rates (RERs). This approach has several advantages. First, the levels of the Big Mac RER can be measured meaningfully. Second, as the exact composition of a Big Mac is known, the contributions of its tradable and non-tradable components can be estimated relatively precisely. Third, the dynamics of the RER can be studied in a setting free of several biases inherent in CPI-based RERs. Finally, a large cross-country dimension allows us to overturn the Engel result on what drives RERs.

This paper examines two related issues: (a) the implicit methodology used by the U.S. Treasury in determining whether China and America's other trading partners manipulate their exchange rates, and (b) the nature of the Chinese exchange rate regime since July 2005.

While new conventional wisdom warns that developing countries should be aware of the risks of premature capital account liberalization, the costs of not removing exchange controls have received much less attention. This paper investigates the negative effects of exchange controls on trade. To minimize evasion of controls, countries often intensify inspections at the border and increase documentation requirements. Thus, the cost of conducting trade rises.

This paper aims to provide a theory of current account adjustment that generalizes the textbook version of the intertemporal approach to current account and places domestic labor market institutions at the center stage. In general, in response to a shock, an economy adjusts through a combination of a change in the composition of goods trade (i.e., intra-temporal trade channel) and a change in the current account (i.e., intertemporal trade channel). The more rigid the labor market, the slower the speed of adjustment of the current account towards its long-run equilibrium.

This paper analyzes the determinants of buyout funds' investment decisions. In a model in which the supply of capital is "sticky" in the short run, we link the timing of funds' investment decisions, their risk-taking behavior, and the returns they subsequently earn on their buyouts to changes in the demand for private equity, conditions in the credit market, and funds' ability to influence their perceived talent in the market. Using a proprietary dataset of 207 buyout funds that invested in 2,274 buyout targets over the last two decades, we then investigate the implications of the model.

Surveys do! We examine the forecasting power of four alternative methods of forecasting U.S. inflation out-of-sample: time-series ARIMA models; regressions using real activity measures motivated from the Phillips curve; term structure models that include linear, non-linear, and arbitrage-free specifications; and survey-based measures. We also investigate several methods of combining forecasts. Our results show that surveys outperform the other forecasting methods and that the term structure specifications perform relatively poorly.

Although the vast majority of real options models assume that investment opportunities are permanently available, many real-world investment opportunities are sporadic. Options to invest can suddenly become blacked-out, only to be followed by a re-opening in the future. For example, the option to develop real estate may open or close depending upon zoning and growth control decisions, competitive entry, or input (labor or material) availability. Similar factors influence complex R&D options. We term such randomly recurring investment opportunities as options on illiquid projects.