Beneath the pounding of the percussion and sonority of the strings, beyond the reach of the conductor's gesticulations and exhortations, behind the serenity of the crowd's spirit looms the daunting, incessant, and necessary process of funding a symphony orchestra, of creating and maintaining a public for its music.
Faced with turbulent national and international environments, entire U.S. industries-most notably steel and automobiles-have revealed a distinct propensity to overlook radically new types of competitors, cling to traditional technologies, and remain mired in similar, yet outdated, strategic postures. In this article, we ascribe the adaptive failures of entire industries not only to the micro-cultures of single organizations, but also to what we term inter-organizational "macro-cultures"-relatively idiosyncratic beliefs that are shared by managers across organizations.
Riding the crest of recent artistic and organizational successes, this self-governing symphony orchestra now confronts the challenge of engendering a culture in which, in the words of the managing director, "everyone in the orchestra is constantly thinking, how can we make this better?"
Why do some new ventures succeed while others fail? What is the essence of entrepreneurship? Who is most likely to become a successful entrepreneur and why? How do entrepreneurs make decisions? What market, regulatory, and organizational environments foster the most successful entrepreneurial activities? Entrepreneurship research is plagued by these and other fundamental unanswered questions, for which there does not exist a cohesive explanatory, predictive, or normative theory.
We analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor. Both agents have potentially conflicting objectives since the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project while the investor is only concerned about monetary returns.
Four groups are identified among 113 Fortune 500 manufacturers that approach innovation quite differently. The groups are based on 27 measured elements of formal and informal organization, corporate strategy, and corporate environment. Both financial performance and product innovation differ significantly among the groups. A group of 42 firms that invest heavily in innovation perform the best financially, with a smaller group of firms that are not innovative but which follow a strategy of acquisition performing nearly as well financially.
A number of issues that relate to the desirability and implications of new venture financing are examined within a principal-agent framework that captures the essence of the relationship between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The model suggests: (1) As long as the skill levels of entrepreneurs are common knowledge, all will choose to involve venture capital investors, since the risk sharing provided by outside participation dominates the agency relationship that is created.