Leadership & Organizational Behavior

In this chapter, we discuss both the criticisms and benefits of advertising and address ethical concerns for anthropologists involved in the creation of advertising. We examine how ethical complexities range from the question of advertising as a necessary form of consumer-brand engagement to socially responsible advertising as a necessary form of consumer-brand engagement to socially responsible advertising, to professional ethics surrounding the objects or brands being advertised, and to the work of anthropologists in advancing advertising campaigns.

We study an international law firm that changed its compensation plan for team leaders to address a multitasking problem: team leaders were focusing their effort on billable hours and not spending sufficient time on "leadership" activities to build the firm. Compensation was changed to provide greater incentives for the leadership activities and weaker incentives for billable hours. The effect of this change on the task allocation of the firm's team leaders is large and robust; team leaders increase their non-billable hours and shift billable hours to team members.

The incentive contracts of delegated investment managers may have unintended negative consequences for asset prices. I show that managers who are compensated for relative performance optimally shift their portfolio weights towards those of the benchmark when volatility rises, putting downward price pressure on overweight stocks and upward pressure on underweight stocks. In quarters when volatility rises most (top quintile), a portfolio of aggregate-underweight minus aggregate-overweight stocks returns 3% to 8% per quarter depending on the risk adjustment.

We introduce a tractable dynamic monitoring technology into a continuous-time moral hazard problem and study the optimal long-term contract between principal and agent. Monitoring adds value by allowing the principal to reduce the intensity of performance-based incentives, reducing the likelihood of costly termination. We present a novel characterization of optimal dynamic incentive provision when performance-based incentives may decline continuously to zero. Termination happens in equilibrium only if its costs are relatively low.

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework of housing and mortgage markets with aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, costly liquidity and strategic defaults, empirically relevant informational asymmetries, and endogenous mortgage design. We show that adverse selection plays an important role in shaping the form of an equilibrium contract. If borrowers' homeownership values are known, aggregate wages and house prices determine the optimal state-contingent mortgage payments, which efficiently reduces the costs of liquidity default.

We present a novel theory of the employment relationship. A manager can invest in attention technology to recognize good worker performance. The technology may break and is costly to replace. We show that as time passes without recognition, the worker's belief about the manager's technology worsens and his effort declines. The manager responds by investing, but this investment is insufficient to stop the decline in effort and eventually becomes decreasing. The relationship, therefore, continues deteriorating, and a return to high performance becomes increasingly unlikely.

This paper presents an Agentic-Communal Model of Power as a means to understand how power shapes and guides consumer behavior. We present theoretical arguments and review empirical data that reveal how the possession of power can produce a more agentic orientation within consumers, whereas the lack of power can produce a more communal orientation within consumers. As a consequence of either an increased agentic or communal orientation, psychological states of power and powerlessness affect a wide variety of consumer behaviors ranging from gift giving to persuasion to consumer misconduct.

Investigations of the basic risk-return trade-off for the market return typically use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with a monthly or quarterly horizon and data sampled to match the horizon even though daily data are available. We develop an overlapping data inference methodology for such models that uses all of the data while maintaining the monthly or quarterly forecasting period. Our approach recognizes that the first order conditions of MLE can be used as orthogonality conditions of the generalized method of moments (GMM).

This paper studies optimal communication flows in organizations. A production process can be coordinated ex ante, by letting agents stick to a prespecified plan of action. Alternatively, agents may adapt to task-specific shocks, in which case tasks must be coordinated ex post, using communication. When attention is scarce, an optimal organization coordinates only a few tasks ex post. Those tasks are higher performing, more adaptive to the environment, and influential. Hence, scarce attention requires setting priorities, not just local optimization.