Leadership & Organizational Behavior

The article explores the increasing popularity and importance of interest arbitration with regard to resolving collective bargaining disputes in public sector labor relations in the U.S. In avoiding or terminating strikes that threaten basic public interest, the use of arbitration may pose the only practical means of dealing with the situation. Furthermore, third-party figures brought to negotiating disputes harbors a fairness concept that is often viewed an important ingredient of labor stability.

The degeneration of orderly relationships between city governments and their employees seriously complicates the nature of government and democracy in urban America. While most cities have not yet experienced major minimal labor breakdowns, most city governments do suffer from seemingly chronic conditions, like inadequate revenues and spiraling costs, which easily can serve as catalysts for municipal labor crises. Data show that serious labor relations problems are no longer limited to a few unfortunate cities like New York, the subject of this study.

We study the competitive provision and endogenous acquisition of political information. Our main result identifies a natural equilibrium channel through which a more competitive market decreases the efficiency of policy outcomes. A critical insight we put forward is that competition among information providers leads to informational specialization: firms provide relatively less information on issues that are of common interest and relatively more information on issues on which agents’ preferences are heterogeneous.

Bank balance sheet lending is commonly viewed as the predominant form of lending. We document and study two margins of adjustment that are usually absent from this view using microdata in the $10 trillion U.S. residential mortgage market. We first document the limits of the shadow bank substitution margin: shadow banks substitute for traditional “deposit-taking” banks in loans which are easily sold, but are limited from activities requiring on-balance-sheet financing.

In this paper, I estimate the magnitude of an informational friction limiting credit reallocation to firms during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. Because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end, borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected. I show how to separately identify private information from information common to all lenders but unobservable to the econometrician by using bank shocks within a discrete choice model of relationships.

We propose a view of conglomerates that is at odds with what was seen in the implementation of highly unrelated diversification strategies pursued in the 1960s. Many of their differences emanated from development of the Internet’s enhanced computing power which facilitated greater controls as well as significant scalability.

Widespread narratives about leadership often emphasize the importance of exhibiting agentic traits like assertiveness, ambition, and confidence. Counter to this perspective, the present research suggests that when evaluating leaders, followers especially value communal traits, such as honesty, open-mindedness, and compassion—even at the expense of agentic traits. Eight preregistered studies reveal that people describe their ideal leader as more communal than the typical leader, representing a divide between preferred versus prototypical leaders.