Leadership & Organizational Behavior

A bilateral moral-hazard problem provides a rationale for "up-or-out" employment contracts. The employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm-specific capital. If the individual does not make the grade, it is in the firm's interest ex post to fire him. Had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals, the firm would underreport the value of the employee, wrecking the incentive scheme. The basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral.

We provide a deterministic example in which parties sign a contract which they anticipate will be subsequently renegotiated. The renegotiation is socially desirable. In the example, the cost of writing and enforcing contracts increases their complexity.

A great deal of research on the empirical behavior of inventories examines some variant of the production smoothing model of finished goods inventories. The overall assessment of this model that exists in the literature is quite negative: there is little evidence that manufacturers hold inventories of finished goods in order to smooth production patterns. This paper examines whether this negative assessment of the model is due to one or both of two features: costs shocks and seasonal fluctuations.

This paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation. In this theory, suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable actions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past. We develop a model to establish the cases in which simple contracts cannot achieve desirable outcomes, so that only a complicated contract or renegotiation will serve. Unlike most previous accounts of contract renegotiation, this theory does not rely on exogenous uncertainty to motive renegotiation.

This papers introduces a market-based typology of corporate strategy, which builds on previous typologies (Rumelt 1974, 1982). We argue that, because different markets require different skills for success, firms which concentrate in one market area (consumer or industrial), at given levels of diversification, should achieve superior performance. Empirical tests with a sample of manufacturing firms support this proposed relationship between diversification strategy and financial performance.

We acknowledge that the behavior of the OSHA and EPA is complex and cannot be explained by simple capture theories, we nonetheless find ample evidence of OSHA and EPA actions that unnecessarily exacerbate or even artificially create indirect effects for political purposes (what we call enforcement asymmetries). Furthermore, despite mounting evidence of the inefficiency of OSHA and EPA, Congress has continued to be uninterested in adequate monitoring of regulatory effect, much less in regulatory reform.

A model for the systematic evaluation and management of a company's technological resources is proposed as a first step to developing an integrated corporate marketing-technology strategy. The proposed framework raises 4 issues: 1. technology identification, 2. technology additions, 3. technological commercialization, and 4. treatment of individual technologies as interdependent elements making up an integrated, coherent plan. The technological decision nexus involves decisions related to the firm's development and commercialization of its technology.