Strategy

We examine the microeconomics of using algorithms to nudge decision-makers towards particular social outcomes. We refer to this as "algorithmic social engineering." In this article, we apply classic strategic communication models to this strategy. Manipulating predictions to express policy preferences strips the predictions of informational content and can lead decision-makers to ignore them. When social problems stem from decision-makers’ objectives (rather than their information sets), algorithmic social engineering exhibits clear limitations.

Amazon's entry into Finland had been expected for years by S Group, Finland's largest retailer. Now that the company's arrival in their home market was imminent, S Group needed to decide quickly on the best strategy for survival and the optimal path to future growth. The company's executive board had several options: staying focused on the Finnish market, expanding into global markets, or tapping their world-class data and logistics expertise to forge another path.

The Emerging Video Cloud System

Few questions are fraught with more long-term implications than the way we shape our communications system. If the medium is indeed the message, and if these messages influence people and institutions, then tomorrow’s media, and today’s media policies, will govern future society, culture, and economy.

Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) develop a model of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, in which the agent experiences prospect-theory inspired "gain-loss utility" by comparing his actual consumption to all his previously expected consumption outcomes. Koszegi and Rabin (2009) generalize the static model to a dynamic setting by assuming that the agent experiences both contemporaneous gain-loss utility over present consumption and prospective gain-loss utility over changes in expectations about future consumption.

Over the past decade, data has transformed everyday life. While it has changed the way people shop and businesses operate (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2019), it has only just begun to permeate economists thinking about the aggregate economy. In the early twentieth century, economists like Schultz (1943) analyzed agrarian economies and land-use issues. As agricultural productivity improved, production shifted more to manufacturing. Modern macroeconomics adapted with models featuring capital and labor, markets for goods, and equilibrium wages (Solow, 1956).

Although consumer behavior theory has traditionally regarded evaluations as instrumental to consumer choice, in reality consumers often assess and express what they like and dislike even when there is no decision at stake. Why are consumers so eager to express their evaluations when there is no ostensible purpose for doing so? In this research, we advance the thesis that this is because consumers derive an inherent pleasure from assessing and expressing their likes and dislikes.

The well-documented underreaction of stock prices to news exhibits substantial time variation. Higher risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries, lower passive ownership of stocks, and more informative news increase price responses to contemporaneous news; surprisingly, they also increase price responses to lagged news (underreaction). Our findings are not driven by short-sale constraints, serial correlation in news flow, or improved information processing capacity. We discuss possible mechanisms based on investor behavior and strategic order-splitting by institutions.

We use a labor-search model to explain why the worst employment slumps often follow expansions of household debt. We find that households protected by limited liability suffer from a household-debt-overhang problem that leads them to require high wages to work. Firms respond by posting high wages but few vacancies. This vacancy-posting effect implies that high household debt leads to high unemployment.