Leadership & Organizational Behavior

Managing Change: Cases and Concepts, 3e by Todd Jick and Maury Peiperl is comprised of six modules that introduce common threads in the ensuing case studies and readings on organizational change. The materials in this edition — cases and readings — have been chosen and arranged to introduce change as an integrated process. Cases in the text represent a wide variety of change situations. Accompanying many cases are readings, likewise chosen to reflect a broad range of issues.

The current investigation explores how power and stability within a social hierarchy interact to affect risk taking. Building on a diverse, interdisciplinary body of research, including work on non-human primates, intergroup status, and childhood social hierarchies, we predicted that the unstable powerful and the stable powerless will be more risk taking than the stable powerful and unstable powerless.

We develop a methodology to collect and analyze data on CEOs' time use. The idea — sketched out in a simple theoretical set-up — is that CEO time is a scarce resource and its allocation can help us identify the firm's priorities as well as the presence of governance issues. We follow 94 CEOs of top-600 Italian firms over a pre-specified week and record the time devoted each day to different work activities. We focus on the distinction between time spent with insiders (employees of the firm) and outsiders (people not employed by the firm).

More and more firms are engaging in greenwashing, misleading consumers about their environmental performance or the environmental benefits of a product or service. The skyrocketing incidence of greenwashing can have profound negative effects on consumer and investor confidence in green products. Mitigating greenwashing is particularly challenging in a context of limited and uncertain regulation.

The current research explored whether sharing intentionality leads to implicit coordination, a situation in which isolated individuals independently adopt a similar standard of behavior. We propose that knowing that a given goal is experienced in common with other in-group members or similar others intensifies goal pursuit. Two experiments examined whether simply being aware that one's own individual goal was also being separately pursued by similar others results in more goal-congruent behavior.

The current research investigated whether mind-sets and contexts that afford a focus on self-other differences can facilitate perceptual and conceptual forms of perspective taking. Supporting this hypothesis, results showed that directly priming a difference mind-set made perceivers more likely to spontaneously adopt other people's visual perspectives (Experiment 1) and less likely to overimpute their own privileged knowledge to others (Experiments 2 and 3).

Five experiments investigated the hypothesis that perspective taking — actively contemplating others' psychological experiences — attenuates automatic expressions of racial bias. Across the first 3 experiments, participants who adopted the perspective of a Black target in an initial context subsequently exhibited more positive automatic interracial evaluations, with changes in automatic evaluations mediating the effect of perspective taking on more deliberate interracial evaluations.

The empty creditor problem arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy. We analyze this problem from an ex-ante and ex-post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment, by comparing contracting outcomes with and without insurance through credit default swaps (CDS).

We analyze contagious sovereign debt crises in financially integrated economies. Under financial integration banks optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign debt in an effort to minimize the costs with respect to an individual country"s sovereign debt default. While diversification generates risk diversification benefits ex ante, it also generates contagion ex post. We show that financial integration without fiscal integration results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of government debt.