Leadership & Organizational Behavior

In this paper, limited managerial capacity gives rise to a timing option: agents can implement projects now-or-later. Because each agent cares only about the project he implements, while the principal cares about the projects undertaken in aggregate, the timing option may be valued differently by the principal and the agents. Under a fair assignment rule (one that treats the agents symmetrically), these conflicting valuations result in agents sometimes not implementing the principal's desired projects.

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of an agricultural economy in which poor farmers borrow from rich farmers. Because output is stochastic (we allow for idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks), there may be default ex post. We compare equilibria with and without political intervention. Intervention takes the form of a moratorium and is decided by voting. When bad economic shocks are highly likely, state-contingent debt moratoria always improve ex post efficiency and may also improve ex ante efficiency. Moreover, the threat of moratoria enhances efficiency.

In this paper, we develop an approach for filtering state variables in the setting of continuous-time jump-diffusion models. Our method computes the filtering distribution of latent state variables conditional only on discretely observed observations in a manner consistent with the underlying continuous-time process. The algorithm is a combination of particle filtering methods and the "filling-in-the-missing-data" estimators which have recently become popular. We provide simulation evidence to verify that our method provides accurate inference.

This article proposes a model of judgment revision, which posits that counterattitudinal challenges to a brand initially trigger a memory search for proattitudinal information about this brand. The proattitudinal information accessible from memory is then aligned with information contained in the challenge in order to assess the diagnosticity of the challenge, that is, how much it "damages" the retrieved brand information. If the challenge is not perceived to be diagnostic, the retrieved brand information is used to defend the previous attitudinal position.

Past research has indicated that rapport helps negotiators overcome interpersonal friction and find cooperative agreements. Study 1 explored differences in the behavioral dynamics evoked by e-mail versus face-to-face negotiation. Although some behavioral content categories differed in ways pointing to strengths of e-mail, the strongest patten was that e-mail inhibited the process of exchanging personal information through which negotiators establish rapport. The authors hypothesized that the liabilities of e-mail might be minimized by a pre-negotiation intervention of social lubrication.

This paper studies the economic benefits of return predictability by analyzing the impact of market and volatility timing on the performance of optimal portfolio rules. Using a model with time-varying expected returns and volatility, we form optimal portfolios sequentially and generate out-of-sample portfolio returns. We are careful to account for estimation risk and parameter learning.

We examine how gender stereotypes affect performance in mixed-gender negotiations. We extend recent work demonstrating that stereotype activation leads to a male advantage and a complementary female disadvantage at the bargaining table (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001). In the present investigation, we regenerate the stereotype of effective negotiators by associating stereotypically feminine skills with negotiation success.

This paper evaluates the specification errors of several empirical asset pricing models that have been developed as potential improvements on the CAPM. We use the methodology of Hansen and Jagannathan (J. Finance 51 (1997) 3), and the test assets are the 25 Fama-French (J. Financial Econom. 52 (1997) 557) equity portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market ratio, and the Treasury bill. We allow the parameters of each model's pricing kernel to fluctuate with the business cycle. While we cannot reject correct pricing for Campbell's (J. Political Econom.

This paper studies how to assign monitors to productive agents in order to generate signals about the agents' performance that are most useful from a contracting perspective. We show that if signals generated by the same monitor are negatively (positively) correlated, then the optimal monitoring assignment will be focused (dispersed). This holds because dispersed monitoring allows the firm to better utilize relative performance evaluation.