We propose a dynamic equilibrium model of asset prices and trading volume when agents face fixed transactions costs. We show that even small fixed costs can give rise to large "no-trade" regions for each agent's optimal trading policy. The inability to trade more frequently reduces the agents' asset demand and in equilibrium gives rise to a significant illiquidity discount in asset prices.
One role of accounting is to discipline softer (more manipulable) sources of information. We use a principal-agent model of hidden actions and hidden information to study this role. In our model, there is both a verifiable signal (a publicly observed output) and an unverifiable signal (a productivity parameter privately observed by the agent). In a one-period setting, the optimal contract does not make use of the agent's report on the private signal. However, when the output is tracked over two periods, the agent's communication can be valuable.
Intertemporal aggregation results in a summarization of information and a natural delay in the release of information. We study a principal-agent model and show that intertemporal aggregation can be an optimal feature of a performance evaluation system. We then highlight subtleties associated with valuing additional information as the level of aggregation of existing information is varied.
Three experiments investigated the hypothesis that power increases an action orientation in the power holder, even in contexts where power is not directly experienced. In Experiment 1, participants who possessed structural power in a group task were more likely to take a card in a simulated game of blackjack than those who lacked power. In Experiment 2, participants primed with high power were more likely to act against an annoying stimulus (a fan) in the environment, suggesting that the experience of power leads to the performance of goal-directed behavior.
This paper considers the problem of sequential parameter and state estimation in stochastic volatility jump diffusion models. We describe the existing methods, the particle and practical filter, and then develop algorithms to apply these methods to the case of stochastic volatility models with jumps. We analyze the performance of both approaches using both simulated and S and P 500 index return data. On simulated data, we find that the algorithms are both effective in estimating jumps, volatility, and parameters.
In this essay, I want to look at certain ethical aspects of the way that globalization has proceeded in recent years. I shall argue that in the way that they have sought to shape globalization, the advanced industrial countries have violated some basic ethical norms.
This paper examines continuous-time stochastic volatility models incorporating jumps in returns and volatility. We develop a likelihood-based estimation strategy and provide estimates of parameters, spot volatility, jump times, and jump sizes using S&P 500 and Nasdaq 100 index returns. Estimates of jump times, jump sizes, and volatility are particularly useful for identifying the effects of these factors during periods of market stress, such as those in 1987, 1997, and 1998. Using formal and informal diagnostics, we find strong evidence for jumps in volatility and jumps in returns.
The permanent-income hypothesis (PIH) of Milton Friedman (1957) states that the agent saves in anticipation of possible future declines in labor income (John Y. Campbell, 1987). He also saves for precautionary reasons, and dissaves because of impatience. To justify the PIH in an intertemporal optimization framework, it has been conventional to assume both (i) quadratic utility, to turn off precautionary motives (Hall, 1978), and (ii) equality between the subjective discount rate and the interest rate, in order to rule out dissavings for lack of patience. Neither assumption is plausible.
We hypothesized that the activation of a counterfactual mind-set minimizes decision errors resulting from the failure of groups to seek disconfirming information to test an initial hypothesis. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two experiments examining the decision making processes of groups. The task for both experiments was modeled after the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, and groups had to actively seek disconfirmatory information to make a correct decision.