Leadership & Organizational Behavior

We study a principal-agent model of moral hazard in which the principal has an abandonment option. The option to abandon a project midstream limits a firm's downside risk. From a consumption (production) perspective, the option is clearly beneficial. However, from an incentive perspective, the option can be costly. Removing the lower tail of the project's underlying cash flow distribution also eliminates the information it contains about an agent's (unobservable) productive input.

We consider the role of the endowment in nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit managers often describe the endowment, or fund balance, as serving a precautionary savings function. We provide a description of endowment size, for nonprofit organizations in a wide range of industries in the United States, and find that a large number of organizations have endowments that exceed levels that would normally be considered to be appropriate from a consumption smoothing prospective.

Over a decade ago, these two perspectives on motivation--Deci and Ryan?s (1991) theory of self-determination and Triandis? (1990) cultural theory of individualism-collectivism--were presented at the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation as discrete areas of inquiry in psychology. The consecutive presentation of these perspectives was portentous--both in terms of the research to follow and the recognition by many psychologists that social psychological findings need to be understood within the socio-cultural context in which they occur.

We consider a setting where a firm delegates an investment decision and, subsequently, a sales decision to a privately informed manager. For both decisions corporate income taxes have real effects. We show that compensating the manager based on pre-tax residual income can ensure after-tax NPV-maximization ("goal congruence") for each decision problem in isolation. However, this metric fails if both decisions are nontrivial, since it requires asset-specific hurdle rates and hence precludes asset aggregation.

This paper studies the capital budgeting process in a setting where a manager is privately informed about the profitability of an investment project and enjoys nonpecuniary benefits of control ("empire benefits"). I characterize the optimal required rate of return and show that a delegation scheme with residual income-based compensation can replicate the benchmark performance achieved under centralization. The main result of the paper is that the optimal capital charge rate for computing residual income always exceeds the required rate of return as a result of empire benefits.

From the publisher:From the author of Globalization and Its Discontents comes a history of the boom and bust of the 1990s - how and why it happened, how the seeds of destruction were sown in the midst of apparent prosperity, and how America and the world are still failing to learn the lessons from what went wrong. One reason the invisible hand of market economics may be invisible is that it may not exist. So says former World Bank economist Stiglitz in his analysis of what went wrong with the economic boom and bust of the 1990s.

The chapter has two main sections. The first one describes various violations of the Law of One Price. The section that follow it considers a related, but very different and fundamental issue: Why do people trade?

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Emerging markets have long posed a challenge for finance. Standard models are often ill suited to deal with the specific circumstances arising in these markets. However, the interest in emerging markets has provided impetus for both the adaptation of current models to new circumstances in these markets and the development of new models. The model of market integration and segmentation is our starting point. Next, we emphasize the distinction between market liberalization and integration. We explore the financial effects of market integration as well as the impact on the real economy.

<p>Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examine the comparative corporate governance literature.