Strategy

Expanding upon Simon's (1955) seminal theory, this investigation compared the choice-making strategies of maximizers and satisficers, finding that maximizing tendencies, although positively correlated with objectively better decision outcomes, are also associated with more negative subjective evaluations of these decision outcomes. Specifically in the fall of their final year in school, students were administered a scale that measured maximizing tendencies and were than followed over the course of the year as they searched for jobs.

Friedman's contribution to the consumption literature goes well beyond the seminal permanent-income hypothesis. He conjectured that the marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth shall be larger than out of "human wealth," the present discounted value of future labor income. I present an explicitly solved model to deliver this widely-noted consumption property by specifying that the conditional variance of changes in income increases with its level.

We develop a dynamic incomplete-markets model where an entrenched insider, facing imperfect investor protection and non-diversifiable illiquid business risk, makes interdependent consumption, portfolio choice, expropriation, corporate investment, ownership, and business exit decisions.

Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems, ignoring the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. This paper develops a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns taking the form of cash and "empire benefits." Owners of a vertically integrated firm then will provide division managers with low-powered incentives so as to induce them to bargain "more cooperatively," resulting in higher investments and overall profit as compared with non-integration.

Changes in nominal interest rates must be due to either movements in real interest rates, expected inflation, or the inflation risk premium. We develop a term structure model with regime switches, time-varying prices of risk and inflation to identify these components of the nominal yield curve. We find that the unconditional real rate curve is fairly flat at 1.3%. In one real rate regime, the real term structure is steeply downward sloping. An inflation risk premium that increases with maturity fully accounts for the generally upward sloping nominal term structure

We develop a model of lending and borrowing in markets where the lender has no access to physical collateral and where the borrower is heavily capital constrained. Our model of micro loans, which incorporates a) the absence of access to physical collateral, b) peer monitoring, c) threat of punishment upon default, and d) costly monitoring by lenders is used to determine the equilibrium borrowing rates. Monitoring by lenders is shown to be critical for an equilibrium to exist in our model if the maturity of the loan is too long.

The role of private equity in global capital markets appears to be expanding at an extraordinary rate. Morgan Stanley estimates that there are now some 2,700 private equity funds that either have raised, or are in the process of raising, a total of $500 billion. With this abundance of available equity capital, the willingness of private equity firms to participate in "club" deals, and the leverage that can be put on top of the equity, private equity buyers now appear able and willing to pay higher prices for assets than ever before.

Many corporate executives view private equity as a last resort, as expensive capital that should be tapped only by companies that don't have access to presumably cheaper public equity. The reality of private equity, however, is more complex, and potentially quite rewarding, for both shareholders and management. This paper surveys some of the academic work on the costs and benefits of public vs. private equity, contrasting the private equity investment process with its public counterpart and exploring how such a process may add value.

Traditional product line positioning and pricing models assume that firms have full information about the market demand and consumer preferences. In this paper we consider a setting where the firm has limited market information and tries to select its product positioning and pricing strategy optimally in light of this missing market information. To do this, we use competitive ration and maximum regret criteria, which measure (respectively) the percentage and absolute loss relative to the benchmark case where the firm has full knowledge of customer preferences.