Leadership & Organizational Behavior

This paper introduces a class of state dependent jump (SDJ) models in which the arrival intensity and jump sizes depend on a given set of state variables, including lagged jumps. With this model, we investigate the structure of jumps to U.S. equity indices, concentrating on the predictability of jumps times if found for all of the indices considered: Standard and Poor's 500 and Mid-Cap, the Russell 1000, 2000, and 3000 indices, the Wilshire 5000 and the Nasdaq 100 (NDX).

Affective states of the same valence may have distinct, yet predictable, influences on decision processes. Results from three experiments show that, in gambling decisions, as well as in jobselection decisions, sad individuals are biased in favor of highrisk/high-reward options, whereas anxious individuals are biased in favor of low-risk/low-reward options. We argue that these biases occur because anxiety and sadness convey distinct types of information to the decision-maker and prime different goals.

Several experiments provided evidence that negotiators make systematic errors in personality-trait attributions for the bargaining behaviors of their counterparts. Although basic negotiation behavior is highly determined by bargaining positions, negotiators primarily interpret their counterpart's behavior in terms of the counterpart's personality, such as his or her level of cooperativeness or agreeableness.

We examine the ability of a dynamic asset-pricing model to explain the returns on G7-country stock market indices. We extend Campbell's (1996) asset-pricing model to investigate international equity returns. We also utilize and evaluate recent evidence on the predictability of stock returns. We find some evidence for the role of hedging demands in explaining stock returns and compare the predictions of the dynamic model to those from the static CAPM. Both models fail in their predictions of average returns on portfolios of high book-to-market stocks across countries.

Previous research has shown that wages in industries characterized by higher rates of technological change are higher. In addition, there is evidence that skill-biased technological change is responsible for the dramatic increase in the earnings of more educated workers relative to less educated workers that took place during the 1980s.

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The main change from the single-agent problem is that an agent can now learn from the current experimentation of other agents. Information is therefore a public good, and a free-rider problem in experimentation naturally arises.

We provide a simple binomial framework to value American-style derivatives subject to trading restrictions. The optimal investment of liquid wealth is solved simultaneously with the early exercise decision of the nontraded derivative. No-short-sales constraints on the underlying asset manifest themselves in the form of an implicit dividend yield in the risk-neutralized process for the underlying asset. One consequence is that American call options may be optimally exercised prior to maturity even when the underlying asset pays no dividends.

Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), (Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155?1177) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in ways consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity.