Leadership & Organizational Behavior

Effective communication requires that consumers attribute the message content to its intended source. The proposed framework distinguishes four types of source identification processes-cued retrieval, memory-trace refreshment, schematic inferencing, and pure guessing-and delineates their contingencies. Two experiments examine portions of the framework, and experiment 2 introduces a new methodology for decomposing multiple processes. Findings suggest that when cued retrieval fails, consumers try to refresh the original memory trace for the learning episode-a process that is effortful.

Marketers are making increasing use of very brief messages that mention just a brand name or a brand name with a short headline, as in event sponsorship and program endorsements. There has been debate over the effectiveness of these "advertising fragments." This paper introduces an approach for controlled testing of the effects of advertising fragments. Using a reaction-time based procedure, we show that a key effect of advertising fragments is to revive established brand associations, even though these associations are not explicitly communicated.

This paper develops a model of the breakup or unification of nations. In each nation the decision to separate is taken by majority voting. A basic trade-off between the efficiency gains of unification and the costs in terms of loss of control on political decisions is highlighted. The model emphasizes political conflicts over redistribution policies.

We present simple adverse selection model in which a firm finds it advantageous to insure against bad outcomes and thereby improve its credit quality and reduce its cost of capital.

We document extreme bias and dispersion in the small-sample distributions of four standard regression-based tests of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. The biases arise because of the extreme persistence in short interest rates. We derive approximate analytic expressions for the biases under a simple first-order autoregressive data generating process for the short rate.

This paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets, and it analyses the tickle-down effect of capital accumulation. Moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities. Three main conclusions are obtained from this model. First, when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high, the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution.

We propose a procedure for representing a time series as the sum of a smoothly varying trend component and a cyclical component. We document the nature of the comovements of the cyclical components of a variety of macroeconomic time series. We find that these comovements are very different than the corresponding comovements of the slowly varying trend components.

In the chapter, we review existing literature and offer some new empirical evidence concerning developmental trends in intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. We then examine several possible explanations for these developmental findings and consider their implications for social and educational policy.

This paper studies information system design in a model of double moral hazard in which there is both a decision problem and a control problem. If either problem is considered in isolation, an information system that provides more public information is preferred. However, an information system that provides less public information can, in fact, be desirable because of an interaction between the two problems. The benefit of choosing an information system that provides less information is that it serves as a substitute for commitment for the principal.