Examines the effectiveness of incentives to promote household saving in the United States. Individual retirement accounts; 401(k) plans; Cost-benefit approach to saving incentives; Welfare-theoretic approach to saving incentives.
Industries differ widely in how much managerial discretion, or latitude of action, they allow. This research contributes to the reliable and valid measurement of this important but hard-to-measure construct. We found that (1) a panel of academics showed very high consistency in rating managerial discretion in diverse industries, (2) a panel of security analysts agreed strongly with the academics, and (3) the panel ratings were highly related to archival indicators of discretion posited by Hambrick and Finkelstein.
This paper examines CEO pay in the banking industry and the effect of deregulating the market for corporate control. Using panel data on 147 banks over the 1980s, we find higher levels of pay in competitive corporate control markets, i.e., those in which interstate banking is permitted. We also find a stronger pay-performance relation in deregulated interstate banking markets. Finally, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation.
Examines how the benefits to managers of corporate control affect the relationship between managerial ownership and the stock returns of acquiring firms. Examination of mergers between 1985 and 1991; Characteristics of agency costs to equity in various levels of managerial ownership.
A unique dataset collected from the personnel records of a large company is used to study the relationship between on-the-job training and worker productivity. The analysis shows how information contained in a company database is useful for eliminating heterogeneity bias in the estimation of training's impact on wages and job performance.
Beneath the pounding of the percussion and sonority of the strings, beyond the reach of the conductor's gesticulations and exhortations, behind the serenity of the crowd's spirit looms the daunting, incessant, and necessary process of funding a symphony orchestra, of creating and maintaining a public for its music.
This paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information. Communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others. Agents can reduce this time by specializingin the processing ofparticular types ofinformation. When these returns to specialization outweigh costsofcommunication, it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm.