Leadership & Organizational Behavior

Although a great deal of research has examined specific behaviors that positively affect leaders' negotiation processes and outcomes, there has been considerably less attention devoted to stable characteristics, psychological or physical, that might also influence outcomes at the bargaining table. In the current research, we identify a measureable physical trait — the facial width-to-height ratio — that predicts negotiation performance in men.

Anthropologists who work in advertising and marketing research often make profound strategic contributions. However, many of them do not take an active part in strategy codification, specifically in the hands-on crafting of strategic documents, unless they are employed by advertising agencies as account planners or in strategy consulting firms that institutionalize the process. A concern throughout this chapter is that when anthropologists are absent throughout the process of strategy formulation, the power and influence of their contributions is curtailed.

With globalization, cross-cultural competence is increasingly important to effective policies in international relations, business, and even in our schools and communities. Can we assess the skills and attributes relevant to gaining proficiency in other cultures? What kinds of training can help people toward this goal? Evidence on the assessment question comes from surveys of immigrant acculturation and expatriate adjustment, investigating antecedents including personality, general intelligence (g), and social-cultural intelligence.

We study the optimal composition of corporate boards. Directors can be either monitoring or advisory types. Monitoring constrains the empire-building tendency of chief executive officers (CEOs). If shareholders control the board nomination process, a non-monotonic relation ensues between agency problems and board composition. To preempt CEO entrenchment, shareholders may assemble an adviser-heavy board. If a powerful CEO influences the nomination process, this may result in a more monitor-heavy board.

We present a model of the maturity of a bank's uninsured debt. The bank borrows funds and chooses afterwards the riskiness of its assets. This moral hazard problem leads to an excessive level of risk. Short-term debt may have a disciplining effect on the bank's risk-shifting incentives, but it may lead to inefficient liquidation. We characterize the conditions under which short-term and long-term debt are feasible, and show circumstances under which only short-term debt is feasible and under which short-term debt dominates long-term debt when both are feasible.

How likely is a catastrophic event that would substantially reduce the capital stock, GDP, and wealth? How much should society be willing to pay to reduce the probability or impact of a catastrophe? We answer these questions and provide a framework for policy analysis using a general equilibrium model of production, capital accumulation, and household preferences.