Leadership & Organizational Behavior

The authors propose that gender differences in negotiations reflect women's contextually contingent impression management strategies. They argue that the same behavior, bargaining assertively, is construed as congruent with female gender roles in some contexts yet incongruent in other contexts. Further, women take this contextual variation into account, adjusting their bargaining behavior to manage social impressions. A particularly important contextual variable is advocacy—whether bargaining on one's own behalf versus on another's behalf.

Why companies have had difficulties determining marketing ROI and how they should approach evaluating marketing ROI. (Reprinted from Columbia Ideas at Work, "Many Happy Returns on Marketing," 8/31/2009, pp. 1-2.)

Although established money managers operate in an environment which seems competitive, they also seem to be very profitable. The present value of the expected future profits from managing a collection of funds is equal to the value of the assets under management multiplied by the profit margin, assuming that the managed funds will remain in business forever, and that there will be zero asset flow into and out of the funds, zero excess returns net of trading costs, a fixed management fee proportional to the assets under management and a fixed profit margin for the management company.

The preferred risk habitat hypothesis, introduced here, is that individual investors select stocks whose volatilities are commensurate with their risk aversion. The data, 1995-2000 holdings of over 20,000 clients at a large German broker, are consistent with the predictions of the hypothesis: the portfolios contain highly similar stocks in terms of volatility, when stocks are sold they are replaced by stocks of similar volatilities, and the more risk averse customers indeed hold and trade into less volatile stocks.

Automobile manufacturers in the U.S. supply chain exhibit significant differences in their days-of-supply of finished vehicles (average inventory divided by average daily sales rate). For example, from 1995 to 2004, Toyota consistently carried approximately 30 fewer days-of-supply than General Motors. This suggests that Toyota's well-documented advantage in manufacturing efficiency, product design and upstream supply chain management extends to their finished-goods inventory in their downstream supply chain from their assembly plants to their dealerships.

Since Max Barenbrug and Eduard Zanen founded Bugaboo, a baby stroller company, in 1995, the company had grown into a global corporation with over 800 people worldwide. Such rapid growth and accretion of brand equity presented Bugaboo with both opportunities and challenges. Max's vision was to become "the leading mobility brand in the world." To achieve this vision, the company would have to introduce new products in categories outside of strollers. How could the company capture and replicate the essence of what drove its initial success?

Active investors provide entrepreneurs with risk-sharing and value-adding effort, e.g., in form of advising, networking and monitoring. However, holdup problems may create a conflict between two key objectives for high-quality entrepreneurs: to elicit investor effort and to credibly signal their firm type by retaining shares. As a result, pooling of startup firms of different types may arise, in particular when investor effort is essential. More established firms, with access to multiple signals, can always realize both of these objectives.

We consider a simple variant of the standard real business cycle model in which shareholders hire a self-interested executive to manage the firm on their behalf. Delegation gives rise to a generic conflict of interest mediated by a convex (option-like) compensation contract which is able to align the interests of managers and their shareholders. With such a compensation contract, a given increase in the firm's output generated by an additional unit of physical investment results in a more than proportional increase in the manager's income.

This article reviews shareholder activism by hedge funds. We first describe the nature and characteristics of hedge fund activism, including the objectives, tactics, and choices of target companies. We then analyze possible value creation brought about by activist hedge funds, both for shareholders in the target companies and for investors in the hedge funds. The evidence generally supports the view that hedge fund activism creates value for shareholders by effectively influencing the governance, capital structure decisions, and operating performance of target firms.