Strategy

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework of housing and mortgage markets with aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, costly liquidity and strategic defaults, empirically relevant informational asymmetries, and endogenous mortgage design. We show that adverse selection plays an important role in shaping the form of an equilibrium contract. If borrowers' homeownership values are known, aggregate wages and house prices determine the optimal state-contingent mortgage payments, which efficiently reduces the costs of liquidity default.

We would like to share some of our general observations on activism, economics and the macro environment.

People are more generous toward single than toward multiple beneficiaries, and encouraging greater giving to multiple targets is challenging. We identify one factor, perceived efficacy, which enhances generosity toward multiple beneficiaries. We investigate relationships between perceived self-efficacy (believing one can take steps to make an impact), response efficacy (believing those steps will be effective), and charitable giving.

Top 15 Financial Times McKinsey Business Book of 2015

This paper explores the quantitative asset-pricing implications of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, as introduced by Koszegi and Rabin, in an otherwise traditional Lucas-tree m model. I find that the model easily succeeds in matching the historical equity premium and its variability when the preference parameters are calibrated in line with micro evidence. The equity premium is high because expectations-based loss aversion makes uncertain fluctuations in consumption more painful.

In an "activist risk arbitrage," a shareholder attempts to change the course of an announced M&A deal through public campaigns, and profits from improved terms. Compared to conventional (passive) risk arbitrageurs, activists target deals susceptible to managerial conflicts of interest (e.g., going-private and "friendly" deals) and deals with lower announcement premiums. Their presence increases the sensitivity of deal completion to market signals.

Using mutual funds' quarterly holdings of credit default swap (CDS) contracts over 2007-2011, we analyze the motives for and consequences of funds' CDS investment pre- and post-financial crisis. Consistent with theories, funds resort to CDS selling when facing unpredictable liquidity needs and when the CDS security is liquid relative to the underlying bond, and to CDS buying as part of a "negative basis trade" when the bond is illiquid. Smaller funds follow leading funds in yield searching.

In the value-based approach to business strategy, a firm’s value creation with a buyer—i.e., its value gap—is an important measure. In many formal and informal results, firm profitability depends on whether the firm can identify buyer segments in which it has the largest value gap—namely, a value-gap advantage. These results typically assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that firms have constant marginal costs.

Conventional research in organizational theory highlights the role of board interlocks in facilitating business collective action. In this article, I propose that business collective action affects the evolutionary path of interlock networks. In particular, large market players’ response after a collective action to the classic problem of the "exploitation" of the great by the small provides a mechanism for interlocks to evolve.