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Strategy

See the latest research, articles and faculty on the Strategy Area of Expertise at Columbia Business School.

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Latest on Strategy

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Strategy Faculty

CBS Faculty Research on Strategy

Price Delegation and Performance Pay: Evidence from Industrial Sales Forces

Authors
Wouter Dessein, Mrinal Ghosh, Francine Lafontaine, and Desmond Lo
Date
January 1, 2016
Format
Journal Article
Journal
The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization

Delegation is a central feature of organizational design that theory suggests should be aligned with the intensity of incentives. We explore a specific form of delegation, namely price delegation, whereby firms allow sales people to offer a maximum discount from the list price to their customers. We develop a model of the price delegation decision based on information acquisition that relies on characteristics of our empirical context of industrial sales.

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Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing

Authors
Kinshuk Jerath, Vibhanshu Abhishek, and Z. John Zhang
Date
January 1, 2016
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Management Science

In recent years, online retailers (also called e-tailers) have started allowing manufacturers direct access to their customers while charging a fee for providing this access, a format commonly referred to as agency selling. In this paper, we use a stylized theoretical model to answer a key question that e-tailers are facing: When should they use an agency selling format instead of using the more conventional reselling format?

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Out-of-the-Money CEOs: Private Control Premium and Option Exercises

Authors
Wei Jiang and Vyacheslav Fos
Date
January 1, 2016
Format
Journal Article
Journal
The Review of Financial Studies

When a proxy contest is looming, the rate at which CEOs exercise options to sell (hold) the resulting shares slows down by 80% (accelerates by 60%), consistent with their desire to maintain or strengthen voting rights when facing challenges. Such deviations are closely aligned with features unique to proxy contests, such as the record dates and nomination status, and are more pronounced when the private benefits are higher or when the voting rights are more crucial.

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Moving the Conceptual Framework Forward: Recognition and Measurement

Authors
Stephen Penman and Richard Barker
Date
January 1, 2016
Format
Working Paper
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Reputation Concerns of Independent Directors: Evidence from Individual Director Voting

Authors
Wei Jiang, Hualin Wan, and Shan Zhao
Date
January 1, 2016
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Review of Financial Studies

This study examines the voting behavior of independent directors of public companies in China from 2004–2012. The unique data at the individual-director level overcome endogeneity in both board formation and proposal selection by allowing analysis based on within-board proposal variation. Career-conscious directors, measured by age and the director's reputation value, are more likely to dissent; dissension is eventually rewarded in the marketplace in the form of more outside directorships and a lower risk of regulatory sanctions.

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Who Owns the World’s Media? Media Concentration and Ownership around the World

Authors
Eli Noam
Date
January 1, 2016
Format
Book
Publisher
Oxford University Press

Media concentration has been an issue around the world. To some observers the power of large corporations has never been higher. To others, the Internet has brought openness and diversity. What perspective is correct? The answer has significant implications for politics, business, culture, regulation, and innovation. It addresses a highly contentious subject of public debate in many countries around the world. In this discussion, one side fears the emergence of media empires that can sway public opinion and endanger democracy.

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Dancing with the Activists

Authors
Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch
Date
January 1, 2016
Format
Working Paper
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How useful are aggregate measures of systemic risk?

Authors
Harry Mamaysky
Date
January 1, 2016
Format
Journal Article
Journal
Journal of Alternative Investments

Following the financial crisis of 2008–2009, a large literature has emerged that attempts to quantify and measure systemic risk. In this paper we focus on some of the more popular systemic risk indicators from this literature and ask how well they work, in the following sense: At the aggregate level, what information above that which is readily observable in the market do we learn from these systemic risk indicators?

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Improvisation in Management

Authors
Paul Ingram and William Duggan
Date
January 1, 2016
Format
Chapter
Book
Oxford Handbook of Critical Improvisation Studies

Improvisation is informing new models for strategy and organization design and determining how improvisation can create more productive interactions between individuals in an organization. Management research offers something to the study of improvisation in the form of evidence that groups that combine access to diverse ideas with internal cohesion are more creative and better able to develop those ideas into effective products and performances.

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