Strategy

Hedge fund activism emerged as a major force of corporate governance in the 2000s. By the mid-2000s, there were between 150 and 200 activist hedge funds in action each year, advocating for changes in 200–300 publicly listed companies in the United States. In this article, we review the evolution and major characteristics of hedge fund activism, as well as the short- and long-term impacts of the performance and governance of targeted companies.

We document that contractual disclosures by intermediaries during the sale of mortgages contained false information about the borrower's housing equity in 7–14% of loans. The rate of misrepresented loan default was 70% higher than for similar loans. These misrepresentations likely occurred late in the intermediation and exist among securities sold by all reputable intermediaries. Investors — including large institutions — holding securities with misrepresented collateral suffered severe losses due to loan defaults, price declines, and ratings downgrades.

Is the perceived value of things an absolute measurable quantity, as in economists’ notion of “cardinal utility,” or a relative assessment of the various objects being evaluated, as in economists’ notion of “ordinal utility”? We believe that the answer depends in part upon which judgment system underlies the evaluation. Specifically, we advance the proposition that due to its distant evolutionary roots, the affective system of judgment is inherently more ordinal (less cardinal) than the cognitive system.

This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the productivity of target firms using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves its production efficiency within three years after the intervention, and this improvement is pronounced in industries with low concentration. By following plants that were sold post-intervention we also find that efficient capital redeployment is an important channel via which activists create value.

I view the research articles presented here as prototypical examples of what may be called “the new wave” in studying Asian markets and consumers. This emerging “new wave” has a different focus than research done over the last few decades. Research is shifting from an emphasis on traditional Asian culture toward a focus on consumer culture and how this consumer culture manifests itself in various Asian markets. The “new wave” research also focuses less on general concepts and more on uniquely Asian phenomena. Finally, methodologically research is shifting from “East” vs.

We test the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance — the claim that interventions by activist hedge funds have a detrimental effect on the long-term interests of companies and their shareholders. We subject this claim to a comprehensive empirical investigation, examining a long five-year window following activist interventions, and we find that the claim is not supported by the data.

We develop and test hypotheses regarding the role of social contagion in customer adoption of new sales channels. We examine two aspects of social contagion (local contagion and homophily) and two channels (Internet and bricks-and-mortar store). Drawing on diffusion theory, we propose a conceptual framework that identifies the factors associated with new channel adoption.

Organizing collective action to secure support from local communities provides a source of power for elites to protect their interests, but community structures constrain the ability of elites to use this power. Elites’ power is not static or self-perpetuating but changing and dynamic. There are situations in which elites are forced into movement-like struggles to mobilize support from their community.

Contingent capital (CC), which intends to internalize the costs of too-big-to-fail in the capital structure of large banks, has been under intense debate by policy makers and academics. We show that CC with a market trigger, in which direct stake-holders are unable to choose optimal conversion policies, does not lead to a unique competitive equilibrium, unless value transfer at conversion is not expected ex-ante. The "no value transfer" restriction precludes penalizing bank managers for taking excessive risk.