Strategy

Manufacturing and service organizations routinely face the challenge of scheduling jobs, orders, or individual customers in a schedule that optimizes either (i) an aggregate efficiency measure, (ii) a measure of performance balance, or (iii) some combination of these two objectives. We address these questions for single-machine job scheduling systems with fixed or controllable due dates.

This essay reviews the literature on the role of the financial factors in the Depression, and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the Depression and for macroeconomics. I argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial-real links in the Depression followed a paradigm shift in economics.

We consider a production/distribution network represented by a general directed acyclic network. Each node is associated with a specific "product" or item at a given location and/or production stage. An arc (i, j) indicates that item i is used to "produce" item j. External demands may occur at any of the network's nodes. These demands occur continuously at item specific constant rates. Components may be assembled in any given proportions.

We analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor. Both agents have potentially conflicting objectives since the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project while the investor is only concerned about monetary returns.

This note shows that in environments without externalities or aggregate feasibility constraints, extremely simple mechanisms can be used to approximately ("virtually") implement social choice functions in iteratively strictly undominated strategies.

Four groups are identified among 113 Fortune 500 manufacturers that approach innovation quite differently. The groups are based on 27 measured elements of formal and informal organization, corporate strategy, and corporate environment. Both financial performance and product innovation differ significantly among the groups. A group of 42 firms that invest heavily in innovation perform the best financially, with a smaller group of firms that are not innovative but which follow a strategy of acquisition performing nearly as well financially.

This paper offers a new theory of limit pricing. Incumbents from different markets or regions "compete" against one another, with each attempting to price in a manner that deflects entry into the others' markets. An entrant is imperfectly informed as to the incumbents' respective investments in cost reduction and seeks to enter markets in which incumbents have high costs. In a focal equilibrium, the entrant uses a simple "comparison strategy," in which it enters only the highest-priced markets, and incumbents engage in limit-pricing behavior.

We consider inventory systems with several distinct items. Demands occur at constant, item specific rates. The items are interdependent because of jointly incurred fixed procurement costs: The joint cost structure reflects general economies of scale, merely assuming a monotonicity and concavity (submodularity) property. Under a power-of-two policy each item is replenished with constant reorder intervals which are power-of-two multiples of some fixed or variable base planning period.