This paper is motivated by two facts: failure of log-linear empirical exchange rate models of the 1970's and the observed variability of risk premiums in the forward market. Rational maximizing models predict that changes in conditional variances of monetary policies, government spendings, and income growths affect risk premiums and induce conditional volatility of exchange rates.
In this article we construct a model in which a consumer's utility depends on the consumption history. We describe a general equilibrium framework similar to Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a). A simple example is then solved in closed form in this general equilibrium setting to rationalize the observed stickiness of the consumption series relative to the fluctuations in stock market wealth. The sample paths of consumption generated from this model imply lower variability in consumption growth rates compared to those generated by models with separable utility functions.
The financial payback to the City of Boston from the development of Faneuil Hall Marketplace provides a starting point for analyzing the benefits of public-private downtown project development deals.
A bilateral moral-hazard problem provides a rationale for "up-or-out" employment contracts. The employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm-specific capital. If the individual does not make the grade, it is in the firm's interest ex post to fire him. Had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals, the firm would underreport the value of the employee, wrecking the incentive scheme. The basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral.
This paper considers an M/G/c queueing system serving a finite number (J) of distinct customer classes. Performance of the system, as measured by the vector of steady-state expected waiting times of the customer classes (the performance vector), may be controlled by adopting an appropriate priority discipline.
We provide a deterministic example in which parties sign a contract which they anticipate will be subsequently renegotiated. The renegotiation is socially desirable. In the example, the cost of writing and enforcing contracts increases their complexity.
This paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation. In this theory, suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable actions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past. We develop a model to establish the cases in which simple contracts cannot achieve desirable outcomes, so that only a complicated contract or renegotiation will serve. Unlike most previous accounts of contract renegotiation, this theory does not rely on exogenous uncertainty to motive renegotiation.