Strategy

This paper shows that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) meaningfully affect firm performance. Using variation in CEO exposure resulting from the numer of days a CEO is hospitalized, we provide estimates of the effect of CEOs on firm policies, holding firm and CEO matches constant. We have four main findings. First, CEOs have an economically and statistically significant effect on profitability, revenue, and investment outcomes. Firms whose CEOs are hospitalized underperform when their chief executives are sick but otherwise exhibit similar performance relative to other firms.

Identity movements rely on a shared "we-feeling" amongst a community of participants. In turn, such shared identities are possible when movement participants can self-categorize themselves as belonging to one group. We address a debate as to whether community diversity enhances or impedes such protests, and investigate the role of racial diversity since it is a simple, accessible, and visible basis of community diversity and social categorization.

Many companies do not know their marketing ROI because their organizations are not set up to evaluate marketing ROI.

Large companies are usually organized into business units, yet some activities are almost always centralized in a company-wide functional unit. We first show that organizations endogenously create an incentive conflict between functional managers (who desire excessive standardization) and business-unit managers (who desire excessive local adaptation). We then study how the allocation of authority and tasks to functional and business-unit managers interacts with this endogenous incentive conflict.

Applies economic, marketing, and finance concepts to develop a metric, Customer Value Added, that explains how marketing activities drive the financial performance of an organization.  Includes empirical results for a consumer packaged goods company where Customer Value Added predicted revenue and contribution with R-squared values greater than 0.90.

How to view pricing, cross-selling, and customer loyalty during difficult economic times.  (Reprinted from "Marketing in Difficult Times," Effective Executive, July, 2009, pp. 11-18.)

We argue that a fundamental reason for the short-term perspective of corporate executives is the short-term orientation of shareholders themselves and the financial markets that drive the performance benchmarks of CEOs. Although some shareholders are prepared to take a more long-term view they are generally not rewarded for their loyalty to the company.